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ABSTRACT: We examine an environment where goods and privately informed buyers ar-
rive stochastically to a market. A seller in this setting faces a sequential allocation problem
with a changing population. We characterize the set of incentive compatible allocation
rules and provide a generalized revenue equivalence result. In contrast to a static setting
where incentive compatibility implies that higher-valued buyers have a greater likelihood
of receiving an object, in this dynamic setting, incentive compatibility implies that higher-
valued buyers have a greater likelihood of receiving an object sooner.
We also characterize the set of efficient allocation rules and show that a dynamic Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves mechanism is efficient and dominant strategy incentive compatible. We
then derive an optimal direct mechanism. We show that the revenue-maximizing direct
mechanism is a pivot mechanism with a reserve price.
Finally, we consider sequential ascending auctions in this setting, both with and without
a reserve price. We construct memoryless equilibrium bidding strategies in this indirect
mechanism. Bidders reveal their private information in every period, yielding the same
outcomes as the direct mechanisms. Thus, the sequential ascending auction is a natural
institution for achieving either efficient or optimal outcomes. Interestingly, this is not the
case for sequential second-price auctions, as the bids in a second-price auction do not re-
veal sufficient information to realize either the efficient or optimal allocation.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we study the problem of a seller faced with a stochastic sequential allocation prob-
lem. At each point in time, a random number of buyers and objects arrive to a market. Buyers
are risk-neutral and patient, while objects are homogeneous and perishable. Each buyer desires
a single unit of the good in question; however, valuations for the good vary across buyers. The
mechanism designer must elicit the private information of these buyers in order to achieve a de-
sirable allocation—one that is either efficient or revenue maximizing, depending on the designer’s
objective function.
We show that the properties of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism in the static world
carry through to our dynamic setting. In particular, by using a dynamic analogue of the VCG
mechanism, the social planner ensures that truth-telling is a dominant strategy for all agents,
resulting in an efficient allocation. Moreover, we show that the optimal (revenue-maximizing)
mechanism in this dynamic setting is essentially a pivot mechanism with a reserve price. Finally,
we characterize a simple indirect mechanism, the sequential ascending auction, that serves as a
natural institution for achieving both the efficient and the optimal outcome.
Sequential allocation problems arise naturally in a wide variety of economic contexts. Consider,
for example, the problem faced by an airport with a limited number of take-off and landing slots
available at any time. If the airport wishes to use its limited resources efficiently, it must allo-
cate slots to airlines based on their relative value. However, these values are typically the private
information of the airlines. Therefore, the airport must elicit this information. Without the ap-
propriate incentives for truthful revelation, however, an efficient allocation will be unattainable.
As has recently been proposed for New York’s LaGuardia airport, auctions can play an important
role in providing these incentives. An important mechanism design consideration, however, is
one of market dynamics. New airlines may wish to start serving routes to the airport in question,
while established carriers may consolidate routes or merge with one another. Such events alter
the competitive environment and the demand for the airport’s limited runway space (and time),
and should be taken into account.
Similar problems occur in other settings. Electricity markets must be able to dynamically adjust
to fluctuations in supply (as new generation facilities come online or unexpected outages occur
in existing power plants, for instance) as well as in demand (for example, when consumption
changes in response to weather conditions). The addition or removal of nodes from a commu-
nications network requires the reallocation of bandwidth in response to capacity constraints and
the relative importance or value of network traffic. Likewise, computational tasks submitted to a
supercomputing facility are placed in a queue for future processing in response to the submission
of higher-priority tasks, while sponsored search platforms such as Google or Yahoo! need to dy-
namically assign advertisements to ranked “slots” when internet users search various keywords
and new advertisers join the platform.
The model we consider here abstracts away many of the details of these various situations and
markets, focusing instead on what we view are their essential features. In particular, demand is
not constant, as the set and number of buyers change over time, with patient buyers entering and
exiting the market according to a stochastic process. Similarly, supply is random. In some periods
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there may be many units available, while in others none. Finally, each buyer’s valuation—her
willingness to pay—is private information. Therefore, a welfare- or revenue-maximizing seller
must provide appropriate incentives for information revelation to this dynamic population. The
seller then makes use of this information to dynamically allocate goods to buyers.
It is well known that, in static environments, the VCG mechanism is efficient. By choosing a
transfer payment for each buyer that equals the externality imposed by her report on other par-
ticipants in the mechanism, the VCG mechanism aligns the incentives of the buyer with those
of a welfare-maximizing social planner. This leads to efficiency and dominant-strategy incentive
compatibility, as truthful reporting now maximizes both the planner’s and the buyer’s objective
functions. In the dynamic environment we consider, the arrival of a new buyer imposes an exter-
nality on her competitors by reordering the (anticipated) schedule of allocations to those buyers
currently present, as well as to those buyers expected to arrive in the future. We show that by
charging each agent, upon her arrival, a price equal to this expected externality, the buyer’s incen-
tives are aligned with those of the forward-looking planner. Therefore, this dynamic version of
the VCG mechanism is efficient and dominant-strategy incentive compatible.
In addition, we are able to construct a revenue-maximizing direct mechanism for this setting.
Making use of the risk-neutrality of buyers, we show that the optimal policy for a revenue-
maximizing seller is equivalent to that of a social planner who wishes to maximize allocative
efficiency, except that buyers’ values are replaced by their virtual values. Each buyers’ incentives
may then be aligned with those of the seller by a variation of the VCG mechanism where buy-
ers face discriminatory reserve prices. By providing each newly arriving buyer with an expected
payoff equal to her expected marginal contribution to the virtual surplus, the seller is able to in-
duce truthful reporting of private information in dominant strategies. This allows the seller to
discriminate between buyers in such a way as to maximize revenue.
Both of the mechanisms discussed above are dynamic direct revelation mechanisms, requiring
buyers to report their values to the mechanism upon their arrival to the market. In practice, how-
ever, direct revelation mechanisms may be difficult to implement. For instance, the multi-unit
Vickrey auction—the (static) mutli-unit generalization of the standard VCG mechanism—is a di-
rect revelation mechanism in which truth-telling is a dominant strategy. Despite this, Ausubel
(2004) points out that it lacks simplicity and transparency, explaining that “many [economists]
believe it is too complicated for practitioners to understand.” Moreover, Rothkopf, Teisberg, and
Kahn (1990) explain that concerns about privacy or the potential for future misuse of information
revealed in a direct mechanism may preclude the real-world use of direct mechanisms. These
criticisms are corroborated by experimental evidence. According to Kagel, Harstad, and Levin
(1987), who examined single-unit auctions with affiliated private values, the predictions of auc-
tion theory for bidding behavior are significantly more accurate in ascending price-auctions than
in second-price auctions, despite the existence of a dominant-strategy equilibrium in the second-
price (Vickrey) auction. In another study examining the efficiency properties of several mecha-
nisms in a resource allocation problem similar to the one we consider here, Banks, Ledyard, and
Porter (1989) find that “the transparency of a mechanism . . . is important in achieving more effi-
cient allocations.” In their experiments, a simple ascending auction dominated both centralized
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administrative allocation processes as well as decentralized markets in terms of both efficiency
and revenues.
With these criticisms and “real-world feasibility” constraints in mind, we turn to the design of
simple, transparent indirect mechanisms. In particular, we consider the possibility of achieving
efficient or revenue-maximizing outcomes via a sequence of auctions. Despite the resemblance
of our direct mechanisms to their single-unit static counterparts, we find that this relationship
does not hold for the corresponding auction formats. Recall that, in the canonical auction envi-
ronment, the analogue of the VCG mechanism is either the second-price auction or the ascending
auction. In our dynamic environment, however, a sequence of second-price auctions cannot yield
outcomes equivalent to those of the dynamic VCG mechanism. In a sequential auction, there is
an “option value” associated with losing in a particular period, as buyers have the possibility of
winning an auction in a future period. The value of this option depends, in general, on the pri-
vate information of all other competitors, as the expected price in the future will depend on their
values—despite the assumption of independent private information, the dynamics of the market
create an environment with interdependent values.
Therefore, a standard second-price auction does not reveal sufficient information for the correct
determination of buyers’ option values. On the other hand, the ascending auction is a simple open
auction format that does allow for the gradual revelation of private information. We use this fact
to construct intuitive equilibrium bidding strategies for buyers in a sequence of ascending auc-
tions. In each period, buyers bid up to the price at which they are indifferent between winning
an object and receiving their expected marginal contribution to the social welfare in the future.
As buyers drop out of the auction, they (indirectly) reveal their private information to their com-
petitors, who are then able to condition their bidding on this information. When this process of
information revelation is repeated in every period, newly arrived buyers are able to learn about
their competitors without being privy to the events of previous periods. This information renewal
is crucial for providing the appropriate incentives for new entrants to also reveal their private in-
formation, leading to prices and allocations identical to the dominant-strategy equilibrium of the
efficient direct mechanism. Moreover, these strategies form a periodic ex post equilibrium: given
her expectations about future competition, each buyer’s behavior in any period remains optimal
even after observing her current opponents’ values.
Similar arguments apply when considering revenue-maximizing indirect mechanisms. When
buyers’ values are drawn from the same distribution, the sequential ascending auction with a
reserve price admits an equilibrium that is equivalent to truth-telling in the optimal direct mecha-
nism. Thus, the sequential ascending auction is a natural institution for achieving either efficient
or optimal outcomes.
The present work contributes to a recent literature exploring dynamic allocation problems and
dynamic mechanism design. Bergemann and Välimäki (2008) develop the dynamic pivot mecha-
nism, a dynamic generalization of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism that yields efficient out-
comes when agents’ private information evolves stochastically over time. Athey and Segal (2007)
characterize an efficient dynamic mechanism that is budget-balanced and incentive compatible,
again in the presence of evolving private information. In a similar setting, Pavan, Segal, and
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Toikka (2008) consider the more general question of characterizing incentive-compatible mecha-
nisms. While these papers study dynamic mechanisms for a fixed set of buyers whose types may
change over time, we examine a setting where the number and set of buyers may change over
time but types are fixed.
This paper also relates to work on dynamic auctions and revenue management. For instance,
Mierendorff (2008) characterizes an auction mechanism that efficiently allocates a single storable
object when buyers arrive over the course of the auction. Pai and Vohra (2008) derive the revenue-
maximizing mechanism for allocating a finite number of storable objects to buyers whose arrival
to and departure from the market is also private information. Vulcano, van Ryzin, and Maglaras
(2002) also examine optimal mechanisms for selling identical objects to randomly arriving buyers.
When the objects are heterogeneous but commonly-ranked, Gershkov and Moldovanu (2008a)
and (2008b) derive revenue maximizing and efficient mechanisms. In contrast to the present work,
the buyers in these models are impatient and there are a fixed number of storable objects to be
allocated.
Finally, our analysis of indirect mechanisms is linked to the sequential auctions literature. The
seminal work is Milgrom and Weber (2000), which examines the properties of a variety of auction
formats for the (simultaneous or sequential) sale of a fixed set of objects to a fixed set of buyers.
However, they allow for neither discounting nor the entry of new buyers, features that play a
central role in our model. Said (2008) examines the role of random entry in a model of sequential
second-price auctions when objects are stochastically equivalent; that is, when values are indepen-
dently and identically distributed across both buyers and objects. The computer science literature,
motivated in part by the emergence of online auction sites such as eBay, has also turned attention
towards sequential ascending auctions. Lavi and Nisan (2005) and Lavi and Segev (2008) examine
the “worst-case” performance of sequential ascending auctions with dynamic buyer populations.
Their prior-free, non-equilibrium analysis provides a lower bound on the efficiency of the alloca-
tions achieved via sequential ascending auctions.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the general model,
introduces dynamic mechanisms, and extends the static payoff- and revenue-equivalence results
of Myerson (1981) and Maskin and Riley (1989) to a dynamic environment. We provide an ex-
tended example in Section 3 of both the direct and the indirect mechanisms we study, providing
an preview of our efficient implementation results. In Section 4, we fully characterize the efficient
allocation rule and show that truth-telling is dominant-strategy incentive compatible in dynamic
versions of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. We then construct an efficient equilibrium of
the sequential ascending auction in Section 5 and show that it is outcome equivalent to the dy-
namic pivot mechanism. Section 6 parallels the development in Sections 4 and 5, characterizing
the revenue-maximizing allocation policy and constructing an optimal direct mechanism for the
dominant-strategy implementation of that policy. We then show that revenue maximization is
achievable via the sequential ascending auction with a reserve price, in a manner analogous to
the relationship between the static Myerson (1981) optimal auction and the second-price auction.
We return in Section 7 to our example to illustrate these results. Finally, Section 8 concludes. All
proofs may be found in Appendix A.
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2. MODEL
2.1. Buyers, Objects, and Random Arrivals
We consider an infinite-horizon discrete-time environment; time periods are indexed by t, where
t ∈ N0 := N ∪ {0}. There is a countable set I of buyers, where each agent i ∈ I desires a single
unit of a homogeneous, indivisible good. Each buyer i’s valuation vi for this good is private in-
formation, where vi is independently distributed according to the distribution Fi. We assume that
Fi has a strictly positive and continuous density fi and support V := [0, v¯]. We assume that each
buyer’s virtual valuation
ϕi(vi) := vi − 1− Fi(vi)fi(vi)
is a strictly increasing function of vi. Moreover, we assume that buyers are risk neutral, and that
their preferences are quasilinear and time separable. The future is discounted exponentially with
the (common) discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1).
Buyers are not assumed to be present in each period. Rather, buyers arrive stochastically to the
market. In particular, the set I of buyers is partitioned into disjoint subsets {It}t∈N0 , where It
is the finite subset of agents who may arrive in period t. The arrival of agent i ∈ It in period t
is governed by an independent draw from a Bernoulli distribution, where pii ∈ [0, 1] denotes the
probability that i is present. In addition, buyers may depart from the market after each period,
where the (common) probability of any buyer i “surviving” to the following period is denoted by
γ ∈ [0, 1]. Otherwise, buyers remain present in the market until they receive an object. Note that,
unlike the probability of arriving to the market, the survival rate is identical across agents.
Thus, the arrivals and departures of buyers yield a stochastic process {αt}t∈N0 , where αt : I →
{0, 1} is an indicator function of the presence of each agent in period t, and
At := {i ∈ I : αt(i) = 1}
is the subset of agents present in period t. We assume that buyers cannot conceal their presence,
and so αt (equivalently, At) is commonly known to the agents present at time t.
In addition to the random arrival of buyers, several units of a homogeneous, indivisible, and
non-storable good may also arrive on the market. Let kt ∈ K := {0, 1, . . . , K} denote the number
of objects that arrive in period t, where K is the maximal number of objects potentially available in
any given period. As with buyers, the arrival of objects is governed by a stochastic process, where
µt(k) ∈ [0, 1] denotes the probability that exactly k ∈ K objects are available in period t. Moreover,
these objects are non-storable; any unallocated objects “expire” at the end of each period, and
hence cannot be carried over to future periods. This assumption plays an important role in the
determination of the efficient policy, providing a great deal of tractibility. As with the buyer arrival
process, we assume that the arrival of objects is publicly observed, and so kt is commonly known
to those agents present on the market at time t.
Thus, at the beginning of each period, new buyers arrive to the market (and old buyers may
depart). Simultaneously, new objects arrive, replacing any unallocated objects left over from the
previous period. The realizations of these arrival and departure processes are publicly observed
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by all agents present on the market. The mechanism designer may then allocate objects to agents,
and we move on to the following period.
2.2. Dynamic Direct Mechanisms
In this setting, a dynamic direct mechanism asks each agent i to make a single report, upon
arrival to the market, of her type vi.1 We denote by ∅ the “report” of an agent who has not arrived
to the market. Thus, the mechanism designer has available to her in each period a collection of
reports rt : It → V ∪ {∅}, where R is the set of all such reports. Note that the report ri ∈ V of an
agent i who has arrived need not be truthful, as this will depend upon the incentives provided by
the mechanism.
Let Ht denote the set of period-t histories, where each history ht ∈ Ht is a sequence of arrivals
and departures (of buyers and objects), agent reports, and allocations up to, and including, period
t− 1. Thus, we have
ht = (α0, k0, r0, x0, α1, k1, r1, x1, . . . , αt−1, kt−1, rt−1, xt−1) ,
where xs =
{
xi,s
}
i∈I ∈ X := {0, 1}I is the allocation in period s.
A dynamic direct mechanism is then a sequence of feasible allocations and feasible monetary trans-
fersM = {xt,pt}t∈N0 , where we abuse notation and denote by
xt : Ht × {0, 1}I ×K×R → ∆(X)
a collection of allocation probabilities for each agent, and denote by
pt : Ht × {0, 1}I ×K×R → RI
a collection of monetary transfers from each agent. The period-t allocation xt = {xi,t}i∈I is a feasible
allocation if, and only if,
∑
i∈I
xi,t ≤ kt
and
xi,t = 0 for all i /∈ At.
These two conditions require, respectively, that no more objects than are available in period t are
allocated at that time, and that objects are only allocated to agents that are present on the market.
Notice that we have implicitly ruled out the possibility of allocating multiple objects to any agent
as a consequence of the single-unit demand assumption. Similarly, pt = {pi,t}i∈I is a feasible
monetary transfer if, and only if,
pi,t = 0 for all i /∈ At;
that is, agents who are not present on the market cannot make or receive payments.
We assume that, upon her arrival to the market in period t, agent i ∈ It observes only the set
At of agents present on the market (equivalently, the indicator αt) and the number kt of objects
available at time t. Agent i does not observe the history of arrivals and departures in previous
periods or the history of allocative decisions, nor does she observe the reports of agents who have
1The revelation principle applies in this setting, and so the restriction to direct mechanisms is without loss of generality.
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arrived before her. Thus, a reporting strategy for agent i, conditional on having arrived to the
market, is simply a mapping
ri : V× {0, 1}I ×K → V.
Let r−i denote the reports of all agents other than agent i ∈ It. The expected payoff to i when she
reports ri ∈ V to the mechanismM and all other agents report according to r−i is then
E
[
∞
∑
s=t
δs−t
(
xi,s (hs, αs, ks, (ri, r−i)) vi − pi,s (hs, αs, ks, (ri, r−i))
)]
,
where the expectation is taken with respect to the arrival and departure processes of buyers and
sellers, as well the history ht and the reports of all other agents that may be present on the mar-
ket. Note that we have dropped the dependence of reporting strategies on histories and market
presence to simplify notation.
2.3. Incentive Compatibility and Individual Rationality
Consider a direct mechanismM = {xt,pt}t∈N0 and fix an arbitrary period t and an arbitrary
agent i ∈ It. Suppose that all other agents j 6= i are reporting truthfully; that is, suppose that
rj(vj, αs, ks) = vj
for all s ∈N0, all j ∈ Is \ {i}, and every (vj, αs, ks) ∈ V×{0, 1}I ×K. For notational convenience,
we will denote this strategy by v−i.
Recall that agent i ∈ It, upon her arrival, observes only the set At of agents present on the
market and the number kt of objects available in period t. Thus, we may define
Ui(v′i, vi, αt, kt) := E
[
∞
∑
s=t
δs−t
(
xi,s
(
hs, αs, ks, (v′i, v−i)
)
vi − pi,s
(
hs, αs, ks, (v′i, v−i)
) )]
.
Ui(v′i, vi, αt, kt) is the expected payoff of agent i ∈ It from reporting v′i ∈ V when her true type is
vi ∈ V and the current state of the market is given by (αt, kt) ∈ {0, 1}I ×K.
The mechanismM is incentive compatible if, for all t ∈N0 and all i ∈ It,
Ui(vi, vi, αt, kt) ≥ Ui(v′i, vi, αt, kt) for all vi, v′i ∈ V and all (αt, kt) ∈ {0, 1}I ×K.
Thus, M is incentive compatible if truthful reporting by all agents, regardless of their time of
entry, the agents present upon their arrival, and the number of objects available, is an equilibrium.
Notice that this condition is equivalent to requiring interim incentive compatibility for each agent,
for every realization of the arrival processes and every realization of the agent’s values.
Similarly,M is individually rational if, for all t ∈N0 and all i ∈ It,
Ui(vi, vi, αt, kt) ≥ 0 for all vi ∈ V and all (αt, kt) ∈ {0, 1}I ×K.
Thus, M is individually rational if all agents prefer to participate (truthfully) in the mechanism
than not, where we have normalized the outside option of each player to zero. As with incentive
compatibility, this must hold for every realization of the arrival processes and every realization of
the agent’s values.
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2.4. Revenue Equivalence
Notice that, due to the agents’ risk neutrality and the quasilinearity of payoffs, we may rewrite
the payoff functions Ui as
Ui(v′i, vi, αt, kt) = qi(v
′
i, αt, kt)vi −mi(v′i, αt, kt),
where
qi(v′i, αt, kt) := E
[
∞
∑
s=t
δs−txi,s
(
hs, αs, ks, (v′i, v−i)
)]
(1)
is the expected discounted sum of object allocation probabilities, and
mi(v′i, αt, kt) := E
[
∞
∑
s=t
δs−t pi,s
(
hs, αs, ks, (v′i, v−i)
)]
is the expected discounted sum of payments. Therefore, we may rewrite the incentive compatibil-
ity and individual rationality constraints as
qi(vi, αt, kt)vi −mi(vi, αt, kt) ≥ qi(v′i, αt, kt)vi −mi(v′i, αt, kt) for all vi, v′i ∈ V
and qi(vi, αt, kt)vi −mi(vi, αt, kt) ≥ 0 for all vi ∈ V,
for all t ∈N0, all i ∈ It, and all (αt, kt) ∈ {0, 1}I ×K.
Define for all t ∈N0 and i ∈ It the function Ûi : V× {0, 1}I ×K → R by
Ûi(vi, αt, kt) := qi(vi, αt, kt)vi −mi(vi, αt, kt).
Ûi is then the expected payoff of agent i from truthfully reporting her value vi. By considering the
properties of this function, we are able to generalize the classic Myerson (1981) characterization
of incentive compatibility and expected payoffs in the static independent private values environ-
ment. In particular, we have the following characterization of implementable mechanisms.
LEMMA 1 (Implementable Mechanisms).
A direct mechanismM = {xt,pt}t∈N0 is incentive compatible and individually rational if, and only if, the
following three conditions are satisfied for all t ∈N0 all i ∈ It, and all (αt, kt) ∈ {0, 1}I ×K:
(1) qi(vi, αt, kt) is nondecreasing in vi;
(2) Ûi(vi, αt, kt) = Ûi(0, αt, kt) +
∫ vi
0 qi(v
′
i, αt, kt) dv
′
i for all vi ∈ V; and
(3) Ûi(0, αt, kt) ≥ 0.
This lemma is the dynamic population analogue of the standard result for static allocation prob-
lems. In particular, instead of a higher type resulting in a higher probability of receiving an object
(as in the static setting), incentive compatibility in this dynamic setting requires that a higher
type has, roughly speaking, a higher probability of receiving an object earlier; that is, the dis-
counted sum of each agent’s expected allocation probabilities must be increasing in that agent’s
type. Moreover, the expected payoffs of a buyer in any two mechanisms with the same alloca-
tion rule can differ only by a constant. As an immediate consequence, we have the following
generalization of the revenue equivalence theorem to our environment, which we state without
proof.
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COROLLARY 1 (Revenue Equivalence).
If the dynamic direct mechanism M is incentive compatible, then for all t ∈ N0 all i ∈ It, and all
(αt, kt) ∈ {0, 1}I ×K, the expected payment of type vi ∈ V of buyer i, conditional on entry, is
mi(vi, αt, kt) = mi(0, αt, kt) + qi(vi, αt, kt)vi −
∫ vi
0
qi(v′i, αt, kt) dv
′
i.
If, in addition,M is individually rational, then mi(0, αt, kt) ≤ 0.
Therefore, in any incentive compatible dynamic mechanism, the expected payment of a buyer
depends (up to an additive constant) only upon the allocation rule. This fact will be particularly
useful in deriving a revenue-maximizing mechanism in Section 6.
3. AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
Before proceeding to the analysis of efficient mechanisms in our general environment, it is in-
structive to examine a simple example. In each period, exactly one unit of the homogeneous good
is available. In the initial period, there are n0 ∈N0 buyers present, and in each subsequent period,
at most one new buyer may arrive to the market with probability ρ ∈ [0, 1]. Buyers are symmetric:
each buyer i’s privately known valuation for a single object is vi, where vi is drawn independently
and identically from the common distribution F. In addition, buyers do not exit the market until
they receive an object.
Thus, in terms of the notation of Section 2, we have |I0| = n0 and pii = 1 for all i ∈ I0, while
|It| = 1 and pii = ρ for all i ∈ It, t > 0. Since buyers do not depart the market without an object,
we have γ = 1. Finally, since there is exactly one unit available in each period, for all t ∈ N0 we
have µt(1) = 1 and µt(k) = 0 for all k 6= 1.
3.1. The Efficient Allocation
In order to achieve allocative efficiency in this simple environment, a social planner should
assign each object to the highest-valued buyer present. While a formal statement and proof of this
result are subsumed by Lemma 2, we will (for now) rely on an intuitive sketch of that argument.
Suppose that in some period t, the planner assigns the object to an agent i with value vi despite
the availability of another agent j with vj > vi. Let t′ > t denote the period in which the planner
eventually allocates an object to agent j, where we allow for the possibility that t′ = ∞ (the planner
never allocates an object to agent j). Notice that by “swapping” the allocations to agents i and j,
the planner is able to realize a gain. In particular, consider the alternative allocation rule that does
not alter the sequence of allocations to agents other than i and j, but instead assigns an object to i
whenever the planner would assign it to j, and vice versa. This leads to a change in the planner’s
payoff of (
δtvi + δt
′
vj
)
−
(
δtvj + δt
′
vi
)
=
(
δt − δt′
) (
vi − vj
)
> 0.
Thus, allocating to a lower-valued buyer when a higher-valued buyer is available is always ineffi-
cient. By letting vi = 0, this argument also demonstrates that the planner should never “discard”
an object when there are any buyers present on the market, but should instead allocate it to the
highest-valued buyer available.
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Denote the efficient policy by x̂. Since agent i receives an object in an arbitrary period s under
policy x̂ only if i has the highest value among all agents present at time s, agent i’s expected
discounted probability of receiving an object
qˆi(vi, αt, kt) = E
[
∞
∑
s=t
δs−t xˆi,s(hs, αs, ks, (vi, v−i))
]
is nondecreasing in vi. It is then immediately clear, by applying Lemma 1, that it is possible to
implement the efficient policy x̂ by designing an incentive compatible mechanism that induces
buyers to truthfully reveal their private information.
3.2. Direct Implementation
A natural candidate for such a mechanism is one based on the static Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
mechanism. In particular, it is possible to align the incentives of the buyers with those of the
planner by charging buyers payments that leave them with a payoff equal to their marginal con-
tribution to the social welfare.2 To see why this is so, suppose there are n buyers {1, . . . , n} present
on the market, with values
v1 > v2 > · · · > vn.
In the case of a fixed set of buyers and no entry, the efficient allocation yields a value to the planner
given by ∑nj=1 δ
j−1vj, as buyer 1 receives an object in the current period, buyer 2 receives an object
in the next period, and so on. In the presence of entry, however, new buyers can and do alter the
times at which existing agents are efficiently allocated an object.
Consider, for instance, buyer 2, the buyer with the second-highest value. If we increase her
value v2 by an infinitesimal amount, the efficient allocation in the current period is unchanged,
and the planner realizes no benefit from the increase. In the following period, however, buyer 2
is allocated an object if either no new entrant arrives (which occurs with probability 1− ρ), or if
a new entrant arrives but has a value smaller than v2 (which occurs with probability ρF(v2)). On
the other hand, if a new, higher-valued buyer does arrive in the next period, the efficient policy
allocates the object to the entrant. The planner must then wait an additional period before poten-
tially realizing the gains from the increase in v2. Since the arrival process is stationary, this implies
that the marginal benefit to the planner from the increase in v2 is given by the geometric series
δ
[
1− ρ(1− F(v2)) + ρ(1− F(v2))× δ
[
1− ρ(1− F(v2)) + ρ(1− F(v2))× δ [· · · ]
]]
= δ
∞
∑
t=0
[δρ(1− F(v2))]t
(
1− ρ(1− F(v2))
)
= δ
1− δ(1− F(v2))
1− δρ(1− F(v2)) .
Integrating this ratio then allows us to then measure the total contribution of buyer 2 over a “null”
buyer with zero value, yielding
δ
∫ v2
0
1− ρ(1− F(v′))
1− δρ(1− F(v′)) dv
′ = δ
∫ v2
0
λ(v′) dv′,
2In an early contribution to the scheduling and queueing literature, Dolan (1978) showed that a VCG-like mechanism
succeeds in implementing an efficient sequence of allocations. His model is closely related to the example we consider
here, but focuses on delay costs instead of discounted gains.
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where we define λ : V→ [0, 1] by
λ(v) :=
1− ρ(1− F(v))
1− δρ(1− F(v)) .
An identical argument may be used to show that the marginal benefit to the planner from an
increase in vk is δk−1λk−1(vk), and thus the total surplus due to the presence of buyer k takes a
similar integral form.
We can thus explicitly calculate the social planner’s expected payoff from following the efficient
policy x̂.3 This is given by
Wn(v1, . . . , vn) = W0 +
n
∑
j=1
δj−1
∫ vj
0
λj−1(v′) dv′,
where the planner’s expected payoff when no buyers are present on the market is
W0 :=
δρ
1− δ
∫ v¯
0
v′ dF(v′).
Similarly, the planner’s payoff under the efficient policy when buyer k is removed from the
market is given by
Wn−1(v1, . . . , vk−1, vk+1, . . . , vn) = W0 +
k−1
∑
j=1
δj−1
∫ vj
0
λj−1(v′) dv′ +
n
∑
j=k+1
δj−2
∫ vj
0
λj−2(v′) dv′.
Therefore, the marginal contribution of buyer k to the social welfare is
wk(v1, . . . , vn) := Wn(v1, . . . , vn)−Wn−1(v1, . . . , vk−1, vk+1, . . . , vn)
=
n
∑
j=k
δj−1
∫ vj
0
λj−1(v′) dv′ −
n
∑
j=k+1
δj−2
∫ vj
0
λj−2(v′) dv′
=
n
∑
j=k
δj−1
∫ vj
vj+1
λj−1(v′) dv′,
where we let vn+1 := 0. Notice that removing buyer k from the market does not affect the al-
location of those buyers ranked above her; however, her presence shifts back by one period the
anticipated allocation to buyers ranked below her. By choosing a mechanism in which transfer
payments are such that buyer k internalizes this effect, the social planner can induce her to truth-
fully reveal her value.
One such mechanism is the dynamic pivot mechanism of Bergemann and Välimäki (2008). This
efficient mechanism prescribes transfers in each period such that every agent i’s flow payoff is
exactly equal to her flow marginal contribution to the social welfare. In this setting, an agent’s
flow marginal contribution is identically zero unless she receives an object. On the other hand,
when the agent does receive an object, her flow marginal contribution is exactly equal to her total
marginal contribution. Therefore, when n agents are present with values v1 > · · · > vn, the
dynamic pivot mechanism gives the object to buyer 1, charging her a payment pˆ such that
v1 − pˆ = w1(v1, . . . , vn).
3A formal statement and proof of this result may be found in Appendix B.
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Rearranging this expression, we see that the transfer paid by buyer 1 is given by
pˆ = v1 −
n
∑
j=1
δj−1
∫ vj
vj+1
λj−1(v′) dv′ = v2 −
n
∑
j=2
δj−1
∫ vj
vj+1
λj−1(v′) dv′. (2)
As we will show formally in Corollary 2 in Section 4, when the social planner chooses transfers as
in the equation above, the efficient policy is implemented in dominant strategies.
3.3. Indirect Implementation
It is important to keep in mind that the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism and its dynamic
derivatives (such as the dynamic pivot mechanism) are direct revelation mechanisms, relying on a
central planner to aggregate the reported values of each buyer via allocation and payment policies.
It is possible, however, to implement the efficient allocation rule via a decentralized indirect mech-
anism. Indeed, the indirect mechanism in which a standard Milgrom and Weber (1982) “button”
ascending auction is conducted in each period admits a stationary and symmetric equilibrium
which is outcome equivalent to the dynamic pivot mechanism.
The following observation is central to the construction of the strategies used in this equilib-
rium. We may decompose the transfer paid by buyer 1 in Equation (2) into two components. The
first term (v2) is the cost imposed on society by allocating an object to buyer 1 in the current period:
if she were not present, efficiency dictates that the object be assigned to buyer 2, leading to a flow
benefit of v2. The second term (the summation), however, is the expected benefit to society from
postponing the allocation to buyer 2. The presence of buyer 1 implies that we anticipate allocating
to buyer 2 in the next period instead of to buyer 3, and to buyer 3 in the following period instead
of to buyer 4, and so on. In fact, this second term is the discounted expectation of buyer 2’s future
marginal contribution to the social welfare.4 We therefore arrive at a natural conjecture: if, in ev-
ery period, each buyer bids up to the point at which she is indifferent between receiving an object
immediately and receiving her expected future marginal contribution to the social welfare, we are
able to achieve the outcome of the dynamic pivot mechanism.
So, suppose that an ascending auction is conducted in every period. In this auction format, a
price clock rises continuously from zero until all but one buyer exit the auction. This final buyer
wins the object, paying the price at which the second-to-last buyer dropped out. The number
of active bidders is common knowledge throughout the auction, as are the prices at which each
bidder drops out of the bidding. (Recall that exits in a button auction are irreversible.) Therefore,
bidders are able to condition their bids on the exit prices of their competitors. We assume that
when there are n buyers present at the beginning of the period, each buyer i initially bids up to
β̂n,n(vi) := vi − δE [Wn(v¯, . . . , v¯, vi)−Wn−1(v¯, . . . , v¯)] ,
where the expectation is taken with respect to the entry process of new buyers and the possible
valuation of a new entrant in the following period. In words, each buyer initially bids as though
she expects that losing the current-period auction leads to receiving her marginal contribution in
4A formal demonstration of this property may be found in Appendix B.
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the future, conditional on each of her n− 1 competitors having the highest possible value v¯. Thus,
β̂n,n(vi) = vi − δn−1
∫ vi
0
λn−1(v′) dv′.
Since λ(v′) ∈ [0, 1] for all v′ ∈ [0, v¯] and δ ∈ (0, 1), the bid function β̂n,n is strictly increasing in vi.
As the price clock increases, the first buyer to exit the auction will therefore be buyer n, the one
with the lowest value.
Because β̂n,n is strictly increasing, the remaining buyers are able to infer the lowest value vn and
condition their expectations about the future on this information. Therefore, when there are n− 1
buyers remaining in the auction, we assume that each buyer i 6= in bids according to
β̂n−1,n(vi, vn) := vi − δE [Wn(v¯, . . . , v¯, vi, vn)−Wn−1(v¯, . . . , v¯, vn)] ,
where the expectation is with respect to the entry and value of a new buyer in the following period,
conditional on the lowest current-period value vn. This expression implies that each buyer now
bids as though she expects that losing the current-period auction leads to receiving her marginal
contribution in the future, conditional on one competitor’s value being vn and the remaining n− 2
competitors having the highest-possible value v¯. Thus,
β̂n−1,n(vi, vn) = vi − δn−2
∫ vi
vn
λn−2(v′) dv′ − δn−1
∫ vn
0
λn−1(v′) dv′.
As with β̂n,n, this bid function is strictly increasing in vi, implying that the second buyer to exit
the current-period auction will be buyer n − 1, as she has the second-lowest value. Moreover,
the remaining n− 2 buyers will be able to infer the second-lowest value vn−1 and condition their
expectations on this information.
Proceeding inductively, we define, for each k = 2, . . . , n, the bidding function
β̂k,n(vi, vk+1, . . . , vn) := vi − δE [Wn(v¯, . . . , v¯, vi, vk+1, . . . , vn)−Wn−1(v¯, . . . , v¯, vk+1, . . . , vn)]
= vi − δk−1
∫ vi
vk+1
λk(v′) dv′ −
n
∑
j=k+1
δj−1
∫ vj
vj+1
λj−1(v′) dv′
to be the price at which buyer i plans to exit the auction when there are k buyers remaining active
in the auction, where we let vn+1 := 0. Each of these functions is strictly increasing in vi, implying
that the auction will end when the price reaches
β̂2,n(v2, . . . , vn) = v2 −
n
∑
j=2
δj−1
∫ vj
vj+1
λj−1(v′) dv′.
Buyer 1, the buyer with the highest value present on the market, will win the current-period ob-
ject. In addition, the price she pays in the auction is exactly equal to the dynamic pivot mechanism
transfer described in Equation (2). Thus, if each buyer bids according to the functions described
above, the sequential ascending auction leads to outcomes identical to those of the dynamic pivot
mechanism. Finally, when coupled with the appropriate off-equilibrium path beliefs, these bid-
ding strategies do, in fact, yield a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the sequential ascending auction
mechanism.
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We should point out that buyers’ beliefs play no role in the strategies above other than in the
expectations of future arrivals and values. More specifically, the bids in each period are “mem-
oryless.” They depend only upon information revealed in the current period, and not on any
observations of past behavior. Since this process of information revelation occurs in every auction
in the infinite sequence, newly arriving buyers are not at a disadvantage to their better informed
competitors. On the contrary, by ignoring information revealed in the past, both informed “in-
cumbents” and new entrants are able to behave in a symmetric manner that yields the correct
incentives for information revelation by all auction participants.
4. EFFICIENT MECHANISMS
4.1. Efficient Policy
In order to examine the properties of efficient mechanisms or efficient auctions in this setting,
it is necessary to develop an understanding of the efficient policy. Recall that, in the static single-
object allocation setting, allocative efficiency is equivalent to allocating the object to the highest-
valued buyer. In our dynamic setting, the structure of the environment—the nature of the arrival
processes and the non-storability of objects—implies that the socially efficient policy is essentially
an assortative matching. In particular, objects are ordered by their arrival time and buyers are
ordered by their values, and “earlier” objects are allocated to higher-valued buyers. Of course,
the feasibility constraints imposed by the dynamic nature of the agent population have an impact
on the nature of the efficient policy, as the ordering of buyers by valuation need not correspond
to the sequential ordering of buyers by their periods of availability. Thus, the socially efficient
allocation policy is, in any given period, to allocate all available objects to the set of buyers with
the highest values.
We consider a social planner who commits to a feasible direct mechanismM = {xt,pt}t∈N0 at
time zero. The planner’s goal is to maximize allocative efficiency; that is, the planner wishes to
choose a mechanismM to maximize
W(M) := E
[
∞
∑
t=0
∑
i∈I
δtxi,t(ht, αt, kt, v)vi
]
,
subject to incentive compatibility and individual rationality, where the expectation is taken with
respect to the arrival and departure processes, as well the values of the agents. Recalling that
qi(vi, αt, kt) from Equation (1) is agent i’s expected discounted probability of receiving an object
(conditional on entry), we may rewrite this objective function as
E
[
∞
∑
t=0
∑
i∈It
δtαt(i)qi(vi, αt, kt)vi
]
,
where αt(i) = 1 if i ∈ It arrives to the market and zero otherwise. (Recall that this arrival occurs
with probability pii ∈ [0, 1] for each agent i.)
Before a formal statement of our result, a few additional definitions are necessary. Fix any state
zt = (ht, αt, kt, v) ∈ Ht × {0, 1}I ×K ×R, where v denotes the truthful reporting strategy by all
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agents. We denote by
A+(zt) :=
{
i ∈ At :
∣∣{j ∈ At : vj ≥ vi}∣∣ ≤ kt} .
the set of agents who are among the kt highest-ranked buyers at state zt. Similarly, the set of agents
who are ranked outside the top kt agents is denoted by
A−(zt) :=
{
i ∈ At :
∣∣{j ∈ At : vj > vi}∣∣ ≥ kt} .
Finally,
A∼(zt) := At \
(
A+(zt)
⋃A−(zt)) .
is the set of agents who are “on the boundary”—the agents who are tied for the kt-th highest rank.
LEMMA 2 (Efficient Allocation Rules).
Suppose all buyers, upon arrival, report their true values. A feasible allocation rule {xt}t∈N0 is efficient if,
and only if, for all states zt = (ht, αt, kt, v) ∈ Ht × {0, 1}I ×K×R,
xi,t(zt) = 1 for all i ∈ A+(zt)
and
∑
i∈A∼(zt)
xi,t(zt) = kt − |A+(zt)| if |A+(zt)| < kt.
Note that the conditions in this lemma pin down the behavior of efficient allocation rules after
almost all histories.5 The second condition applies only in the case of “ties” among the agents,
which are probability zero events. Additionally, notice that the period-t efficient allocation does
not depend on past allocations or history; only the set of objects available (indicated by kt), the set
of agents present at time t (indicated by αt), and these agents’ reported values (denoted by vt) are
relevant.
Therefore, we will henceforth restrict attention to the efficient allocation rule which breaks ties
with equal probability. Thus, the efficient allocation rule is defined by
xˆi,t(αt, kt, vt) =

1 if i ∈ A+
0 if i ∈ A−
kt−|A+|
|A∼| if i ∈ A∼
for all (αt, kt) ∈ {0, 1}I ×K and vt ∈ VAt , where we have dropped the dependence on histories.
From the perspective of any particular buyer i ∈ I , the efficient policy allocates an object after
a history to i if, and only if, i is among the highest-ranking buyers at that history. Thus, given the
values of all other agents, xˆi,t is nondecreasing in vi. Since this is is true for any arbitrary history,
this implies that it is true in expectation for each time period. Hence, the expected discounted
probability of receiving an object qi is nondecreasing in vi. In light of the characterization of
incentive compatibility in Lemma 1, it may then be possible to construct an incentive compatible
dynamic direct mechanism which implements the efficient allocation rule.
5While it is straightforward to do so, we do not formally account for the zero-probability event in which a buyer’s value
is equal to zero. While leaving our results unchanged, this simplifies both our notation and exposition.
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4.2. Efficient Dynamic Direct Mechanisms
A logical candidate for such a mechanism is the classic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism. Re-
call that the VCG mechanism ensures that each agent’s payoff is their marginal contribution to
overall social welfare. In the static setting, the VCG mechanism is not only incentive compatible,
but it is also truthfully implementable in dominant strategies—regardless of the reports of other
agents, truth-telling is a weakly dominant strategy for each buyer. We will now show that this
result extends to our setting.
For any (αt, kt) ∈ {0, 1}I ×K and truthful vt ∈ VAt , define
W(αt, kt, vt) := E
[
∞
∑
s=t
∑
j∈I
δs−t xˆj,s(αs, ks, vs)vj
]
to be the social welfare when the efficient policy x̂ is implemented. Denoting by α−is the agent
presence indicator in period s ∈N0 when i is removed from the market (that is, where we impose
αs(i) = 0), we write
W−i(α−it , kt, vt) := E
 ∞∑
s=t
∑
j∈I\{i}
δs−t xˆj,s(α−is , ks, vs)vj
 .
for the social welfare when i is removed from the market. Thus, the arrival of agent i ∈ It to the
market yields a marginal contribution to the social welfare of
wi(αt, kt, vt) := W(αt, kt, vt)−W−i(α−it , kt, vt).
Thus, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism is the dynamic direct mechanism M̂ := {x̂t, p̂t}t∈N0 ,
where x̂ is the socially efficient allocation rule, and the payment rule p̂ is defined by
pˆi,t(αt, kt, vt) := qˆi(αt, kt, vt)vi − wi(αt, kt, vt)
upon i’s arrival, and pi,s(αs, ks, vt) := 0 for all s 6= t, where qˆi denotes the discounted expected
probability of i ∈ It receiving an object given her arrival at time t.
PROPOSITION 1 (VCG is Dominant Strategy IC and IR).
The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism M̂ is dominant-strategy incentive compatible and individually ra-
tional.
Note that the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism M̂ charges each buyer a single payment upon
her arrival to the mechanism, regardless of whether the buyer receives an object immediately or
not. Since buyers are risk neutral, it is clearly possible to design other payment schemes with
differing streams of payments that are, in terms of expected utility, equivalent to p̂. This may be
especially desirable in the case that γ, the survival probability of each agent from one period to the
next, is less than 1. In this case, an agent may be charged a payment upon her arrival, but depart
from the market before receiving an object in a future period. Thus, while M̂ is individually
rational from the ex ante perspective of an agent arriving on the market, it need not remain so
upon that agent’s departure.
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One mechanism that does not suffer from this problem is the dynamic pivot mechanism of
Bergemann and Välimäki (2008). Their direct mechanism is essentially the generalization of the
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism to the case in which agents’ private information may be chang-
ing over time. By choosing payments which provide agents with their flow marginal contribution
to the social welfare in each period, the dynamic pivot mechanism obtains truth-telling as an equi-
librium which implements the efficient policy.6 Moreover, in our sequential allocation problem,
the dynamic pivot mechanism imposes payments on agents only when they receive an object.
To see why this is true, note first that the flow marginal contribution of an agent i in period
t ∈N0 is simply the period-t contribution to the social welfare provided by i’s presence:
wFi (αt, kt, vt) := wi(αt, kt, vt)− δE [wi(αt+1, kt+1, vt+1)]
= W(αt, kt, vt)−W−i(α−it , kt, vt)
− δ
(
E
[
W(αt+1, kt+1, vt+1)
]
−E
[
W−i(α−it+1, kt+1, vt+1)
])
.
Thus, the dynamic pivot mechanism is then the dynamic direct mechanism M̂F := {x̂t, p̂Ft }t∈N0 ,
where the payment rule p̂F is defined by
pˆFi,t(αt, kt, vt) := xˆi,t(αt, kt, vt)vi − wFi (αt, kt, vt)
for all (αt, kt, vt). This mechanism yields to each agent flow payoffs equal to her flow marginal
contribution.
As stated above, pˆFi,t(αt, kt, vt) = 0 if i does not receive an object. Note that i does not receive an
object only if there are sufficiently many agents j ∈ At with vj > vi such that the efficient policy
allocates to the same set of agents, irrespective of the presence of i. Therefore,
W(αt, kt, vt)− δE
[
W(αt+1, kt+1, vt+1)|x̂t(αt, kt, vt)
]
= ∑
j∈At\{i}
xˆj,t(αt, kt, vt)vj
and
W−i(α−it , kt, vt)− δE
[
W−i(α−it+1, kt+1, vt+1)|x̂t(α−it , kt, vt)
]
= ∑
j∈At\{i}
xˆj,t(αt, kt, vt)vj
must be equal, implying that wFi (αt, kt, vt) = 0, and hence no payment is made by agent i. More-
over, if the efficient policy does allocate an object to agent i in period t, then i will not be present
on the market in future periods, implying that
E
[
W(αt+1, kt+1, vt+1)
]
= E
[
W−i(α−it+1, kt+1, vt+1)
]
.
Hence, i’s flow marginal contribution when allocated an object is exactly equal to her total mar-
ginal contribution at that point in time.
Finally, note that the dynamic pivot mechanism inherits all the implementability properties of
the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism in this context; in particular, M̂F is both incentive com-
patible and individually rational, and truth-telling remains a (weakly) dominant strategy for all
6Bergemann and Välimäki (2008) show this result in the context of a fixed agent population. Cavallo, Parkes, and Singh
(2007) are able to demonstrate that the dynamic pivot mechanism truthfully implements the socially efficient policy in
the presence of an evolving agent population.
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agents.7 This follows directly from the fact that agents’ payoffs are quasilinear. Hence, when agent
i considers the discounted sum of a stream of payoffs, each of which is equal to i’s flow marginal
contribution at some point in time, this is equivalent to a single, one-time payoff equal to i’s total
marginal contribution. Thus, we have the following result, which we state without proof.
COROLLARY 2 (Dynamic Pivot Mechanism is Dominant Strategy IC and IR).
The dynamic pivot mechanism M̂F is dominant strategy incentive compatible and individually rational.
5. AN EFFICIENT AUCTION
It is important to keep in mind that both the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism and the dy-
namic pivot mechanism are direct revelation mechanisms, relying on a planner to aggregate the
reported values of each buyer in order to determine allocations and payments. This raises an
important question: do these efficient mechanisms correspond to a familiar auction format? In
the static single-object case, Vickrey (1961) provided a clear answer: the analogue of the Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves mechanism for the allocation of a single indivisible good is the second-price auc-
tion. Both the sealed-bid second-price auction and the ascending (English) auction admit equi-
libria that are outcome equivalent to the VCG mechanism and are compelling prescriptions for
“real-world” behavior.8
A reasonable conjecture is that a sequential auction would be useful in the context of a sequen-
tial allocation problem. But what type of auction? Clearly, no standard sealed-bid auction format
can achieve the outcome of the dynamic pivot mechanism described above. To see this, consider
the example of Section 3. There, the price paid by the winning buyer depended on her own value,
as well as on the values of all other agents present in the market. However, it is impossible for
buyers in a sealed-bid auction to submit bids that are conditioned on information that is unavail-
able to them. Therefore, information revelation within the course of the auction is a necessary
condition for the indirect implementation of the efficient policy, and the natural candidate for an
open auction format is the ascending auction. In fact, we will now demonstrate that it is possi-
ble to implement the efficient allocation rule via the sequential ascending auction; in particular,
we will construct an equilibrium of this indirect mechanism that yields the same outcome as the
dynamic pivot mechanism.9
We make use of a simple generalization of the Milgrom and Weber (1982) “button” model of
ascending auctions. In particular, we consider a multi-unit, uniform-price variant of their model.
The auction begins, in each period, with the price at zero and with all agents present participating
7Note that since agents’ types do not change over time, we can restrict attention to dynamic direct mechanisms that re-
quire a single report upon agents’ arrival to the mechanism. This differs from the mechanism considered by Bergemann
and Välimäki (2008) which requires agents to make a report in every period.
8Of course, the revenue equivalence theorem applies, and several other standard auction mechanisms are able to yield
efficient outcomes in the single-object static setting. However, they lack the robustness of the VCG mechanism that is
provided by dominant-strategy incentive compatibility.
9Recall that both the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism and the dynamic pivot mechanism impose only a single pay-
ment upon each agent. However, the VCG mechanism imposes this payment upon an agent’s arrival to the market,
leading to a stream of payments that cannot correspond to a standard sequential auction format—a reasonable auction
should require payments from buyers only when they win. The dynamic pivot mechanism, on the other hand, requires
a payment by an agent only when they are allocated an object.
18
AUCTIONS WITH DYNAMIC POPULATIONS: EFFICIENCY AND REVENUE MAXIMIZATION
in the auction. Each bidder may choose any price at which to drop out of the auction. This exit
decision is irreversible (in the current period), and is observable by all agents currently present.
Thus, the current price and the set of active bidders is commonly known throughout the auction.
When there are m ≥ 1 objects for sale, the auction ends whenever at most m active bidders remain,
with each remaining bidder receiving an object and paying the price at which the auction ended.
Note that if there are fewer than m bidders initially, then the auction ends immediately at a price
of zero. In addition, suppose that several bidders drop out of the auction simultaneously, leaving
m′ < m bidders active. The auction ends at this point, and m−m′ of the “tied” bidders are selected
with equal probability to receive an object—along with the remaining active bidders—paying the
price at which the auction closed. With this in mind, each bidder’s decision problem within a given
period is not the choice of a single bid, but is instead the choice of a sequence of functions, each of
which determines an exit price contingent on the (observed) exit prices of the bidders who have
already dropped out of the current auction.
We now informally describe the strategies used by each player in the sequential ascending auc-
tion mechanism. In a sequential auction, there is an option value associated with losing. Buyers
who do not win an object in the current period have available to them the possibility of partic-
ipating in future auctions. Rational bidding therefore requires remaining active in the auction
as long as the price is low enough that the benefit of winning outweighs the expected benefit
of losing. As the price rises, buyers start to drop out of the auction, (indirectly) revealing their
values to their competitors. This information revelation allows any remaining active buyers to
update their beliefs, both about their competitors and about the option value of losing. This pro-
cess continues until the auction concludes. In many cases, however, buyers will already possess
information about their competitors from previous interactions. However, in the equilibrium that
we construct, bidders ignore any such information and begin the information revelation process
anew. This information renewal process allows all buyers, “incumbents” and new entrants alike,
to behave symmetrically, implying that newly arrived buyers are able to learn about their current
competitors without knowledge of the events of previous periods. Therefore, new entrants are
provided with the appropriate incentives to reveal their own private information.
With this in mind, let nt := |At| = ∑j∈I αt(i) denote the number of buyers present in period t.
In addition, taking the perspective of an arbitrary bidder i, let
yt :=
(
yt1, . . . , y
t
nt−1
)
denote the ordered valuations of all other buyers present in period t, where yt1 is the largest value,
and ytnt−1 is the smallest. Finally, for each m = 1, . . . , nt − 1, let
v¯m := (v¯, . . . , v¯) ∈ Vm and y>mt :=
(
ytm+1, . . . , y
t
nt−1
)
.
If, in period t, all buyers are using symmetric strictly increasing bidding strategies, then the prices
at which buyers exit the auction will reveal their values. Thus, over the course of the auction
buyers will observe (in sequence) the realizations y>mt , allowing their bids to be conditioned on
this information. Finally, we define, for each m = 1, . . . , nt − 1,
wt+1(αt, kt, vi, y>mt ) := δE [wi(αt+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m, vi, y>mt )]
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to be the (discounted) expected future marginal contribution of an agent i ∈ At with value vi,
conditional on the period-t presence of m competitors each with the highest possible value v¯ and
nt −m− 1 buyers ranked below i with values y>mt .
Define, for each m = 1, . . . , nt − 1,
β̂tm,nt(αt, kt, vi, y
>m
t ) := vi − wt+1(αt, kt, vi, y>mt ). (3)
We will assume that, in each period t ∈N0, each agent i ∈ At bids according to β̂tm,nt whenever she
has m active competitors in the auction. Thus, each buyer i initially bids up to the point at which
she is indifferent between winning the object at the current price and receiving her discounted
expected marginal contribution in the next period, conditional on being the lowest-ranked of the
nt bidders currently present and all other bidders having the highest possible valuation.10 Notice
that, if vi > vj, then
wt+1(αt, kt, vj)− wt+1(αt, kt, vi)
= δE
[
W(αt+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−1, vj)
]
− δE
[
W−j(α
−j
t+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−1, vj)
]
− δE
[
W(αt+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−1, vi)
]
+ δE
[
W−i(α−it+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−1, vi)
]
= δE
[
W(αt+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−1, vj)
]
− δE
[
W(αt+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−1, vi)
]
,
since removing either i or j in the next period, conditional on her being the lowest-ranked agent,
does not affect the order of anticipated future allocations to any other agents. Moreover, note that
by treating buyer j as though her true value were vi, we can provide a bound for the difference
above. In particular, we have
δE
[
W(αt+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−1, vj)
]
− δE
[
W(αt+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−1, vi)
]
≥ E
[
∞
∑
s=t+1
δs−t xˆi,s(αs, ks, vs)|vt = (v¯nt−1, vi)
]
(vj − vi).
Thus, if vi > vj, then
β̂tnt−1,nt(αt, kt, vi)− β̂tnt−1,nt(αt, kt, vi)
≥ (vi − vj)
(
1−E
[
∞
∑
s=t+1
δs−t xˆi,s(αs, ks, vs)|vt = (v¯nt−1, vi)
])
> 0
since the discounted expected probability of receiving an object in the future is bounded above by
δ < 1. Thus, the agent who is, in fact, the lowest-ranked buyer present in period t will be the first
to drop out of the period-t auction, publicly revealing her value.
At this point, each remaining buyer i bids until she is indifferent between winning the object
at the current price and receiving her discounted expected marginal contribution, conditional on
the knowledge that she is the second-lowest ranked of the nt − 1 bidders remaining active in the
10This is not strictly necessary; any beliefs about the valuations of her opponents will suffice as long as the support of
those beliefs is contained in the interval (vi, v¯].
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auction, that all remaining active bidders have the highest possible valuation, and that the lowest-
ranked buyer present has value ynt−1t < vi. In addition, suppose that buyer j with value vj was
the first to exit the auction. Then ynt−1t = vj < vi implies
wt+1(αt, kt, vj)− wt+1(αt, kt, vi, vj)
= δ
(
E
[
W(αt+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−1, vj)
]
−E
[
W(αt+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−2, vi, vj)
])
− δ
(
E
[
W−i(α−it+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−2, vi, vj)
]
−E
[
W−j(α
−j
t+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−1, vj)
])
.
However, the second difference above may be rewritten as(
E
[
W−i(α−it+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−2, vi, vj)
]
−E
[
W−i(α−it+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−2, vi, vi)
])
+
(
E
[
W−i(α−it+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−2, vi, vi)
]
−E
[
W−j(α
−j
t+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−1, vj)
])
.
Thus,
wt+1(αt, kt, vj)− wt+1(αt, kt, vi, vj)
is the sum of three differences. The first is the gain in social welfare when increasing i’s value from
vi to v¯. The second is the gain in social welfare (when i is not on the market) from increasing j’s
value from vj to vi. Finally, the third difference is the loss in social welfare (when j is not present)
from decreasing i’s value from v¯ to vi. However, since vj < vi, the presence or absence of j from the
market has no influence on when the efficient policy allocates to i, regardless of whether i’s value
is vi or v¯. Therefore, the gain from the first difference equals the loss from the third difference,
implying that
wt+1(αt, kt, vj)− wt+1(αt, kt, vi, vj)
= δ
(
E
[
W−i(α−it+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−2, vi, vj)
]
−E
[
W−i(α−it+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−2, vi, vi)
])
.
A bounding argument similar to the one previously applied may then be used to show that
β̂tnt−2,nt(αt, kt, vi, vj)− β̂tnt−1,nt(αt, kt, vj) > 0.
Thus, there is continuity at the first drop out point, in the sense that the exit of the lowest-
valued buyer does not induce the immediate exit of any buyer with a higher value. Therefore,
if β̂tnt−2,nt(αt, kt, vi, vj) is increasing in vi, the price at which the second exit occurs fully reveals the
value of the second-lowest ranked buyer.
Similar logic may be used to show that β̂tm,nt(αt, kt, vi, y
>m
t ) is strictly increasing in vi for all m,
and that the “continuity” property discussed above holds after every exit from the auction.
LEMMA 3 (Bids are Fully Revealing).
The bid functions β̂tm,nt(αt, kt, vi, y
>m
t ) are increasing in vi for all m = 1, . . . , nt − 1. Moreover, if vi >
ym+1t , then
β̂tm,nt(αt, kt, vi, y
>m
t ) > β̂
t
m+1,nt(αt, kt, y
>m
t ).
Thus, if every buyer follows these strategies in each period, the efficient allocation is achieved.
Under the assumption (which we will shortly verify) that these strategies form an equilibrium of
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the indirect mechanism in which an ascending auction is held in each period, Corollary 1 implies
that ex ante expected payments by buyers in this mechanism must be the same, up to a constant,
as in the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism or the dynamic pivot mechanism. Since the marginal
contribution of a buyer with value equal to zero is identically zero, and the bid of such a buyer
in the conjectured equilibrium is also zero, this ex ante equivalence is exact. Analysis of the prices
paid in the auction mechanism, however, show that this equivalence extends further.
PROPOSITION 2 (Sequential Ascending Auctions are Equivalent to Dynamic Pivot Mechanism).
Following the bidding strategies β̂tm,nt in every period t in the sequential ascending auction mechanism is
outcome equivalent to the dynamic pivot mechanism.
Therefore, following the bidding strategies prescribed in Equation (3) leads to an outcome that
is identical to that of truth-telling in the dynamic pivot mechanism. Moreover, we know from
Corollary 2 that truth-telling is an equilibrium of the dynamic pivot mechanism. It remains to be
shown, however, that the bidding strategies described in Equation (3) form an equilibrium of the
sequential ascending auction mechanism.
Since the sequential ascending auction mechanism is a dynamic game of incomplete informa-
tion, the equilibrium concept we will consider is that of perfect Bayesian equilibrium. This solu-
tion concept requires that behavior be sequentially rational with respect to agents’ beliefs, and that
agents’ beliefs be updated in accordance with Bayes’ rule wherever possible. Since the bidding
strategies β̂tm,nt are strictly increasing, behavior along the equilibrium path is perfectly separating,
implying that Bayesian updating fully determines beliefs. To determine optimality off the equi-
librium path, however, we need to consider the behavior of bidders after a deviation. Since such
post-deviation histories are zero probability events, we are free to choose arbitrary off-equilibrium
beliefs. Therefore, we will suppose that, after a deviation, buyers disregard their previous obser-
vations, believing that the deviating agent is currently truthfully revealing her value in accordance
with β̂tm,nt .
This particular specification of off-equilibrium beliefs is particularly useful. Note that these be-
liefs are consistent with Bayes’ rule even after probability zero histories. This follows immediately
from the fact that, generally, this system of beliefs consists of point-mass beliefs about the types
of other agents. The only agents about whom beliefs do not take this form are those that have yet
to arrive to the market and those who win an object in the period of their arrival—these agents
reveal only a lower bound on their value.
Moreover, this property is equivalent to the condition of preconsistency of beliefs in an extensive
form game of incomplete information put forth by Hendon, Jacobsen, and Sloth (1996), which
Perea (2002) shows to be both necessary and sufficient for the one-shot-deviation principle to
hold.11 This is an important observation, as perfect Bayesian equilibrium, in contrast to sequen-
tial equilibrium, need not satisfy the one-shot-deviation principle.12 We can therefore prove the
following result.
11This condition is called updating consistency by Perea (2002), and is also equivalent to part 3.1(1) of Fudenberg and
Tirole (1991)’s definition of a reasonable assessment.
12These off-equilibrium beliefs also satisfy the “no-signaling-what-you-don’t know condition” in Fudenberg and Tirole
(1991). This suggests that (aside from measurability issues) one could construct a conditional probability system for
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PROPOSITION 3 (Equilibrium in the Sequential Ascending Auction).
Suppose that in each period, buyers bid according to the cutoff strategies given in Equation (3). This
strategy profile, combined with the system of beliefs described above, forms a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
of the sequential ascending auction mechanism.
Proposition 2 and Proposition 3, taken together, imply that the sequential ascending auction ad-
mits an efficient equilibrium that also yields prices identical to those of the dynamic pivot mecha-
nism. Thus, the sequential ascending auction is a natural, intuitive institution that yields efficient
outcomes.
It is interesting to note several additional properties of the equilibrium described above. First,
the proof shows that deviations from the bidding strategies β̂tm,nt are not rational for any agent,
even when conditioning on competitors’ values in the current period. Thus, the strategy pro-
file specified in Equation (3) forms a periodic ex post equilibrium. Introduced by Bergemann and
Välimäki (2008), this notion requires that, given expectations about future behavior and arrivals of
both objects and buyers, each buyer’s current-period behavior is a best response to the strategies
of her opponents, regardless of the history and realized values of her competitors. Since agents
essentially “report” their values in each auction, the extensive-form structure of the indirect mech-
anism leads to a marginally weaker form of implementation (in contrast to the dominant-strategy
incentive compatibility of the direct mechanisms discussed above).
Furthermore, notice that in the sequential ascending auction, buyers have the ability to drop
out immediately once an auction begins. Since the bidding strategies discussed above form a
periodic ex post equilibrium, buyers do not wish to take advantage of this possibility, even if they
know their opponents’ values. Thus, although we have assumed that buyers cannot conceal their
presence when arriving to the market, we may conclude that, in equilibrium, they would not take
advantage of that opportunity were it afforded to them. Moreover, the outcome equivalence result
(Proposition 2) implies that this logic extends to the direct mechanisms considered earlier.
Finally, by using the bidding strategies described above, buyers fully reveal their private infor-
mation. However, the strategy is “memoryless,” as buyers make use only of information revealed
in the current period, disregarding any information that may have been revealed in previous peri-
ods. The necessity of memoryless behavior arises from the informational asymmetry that develops
over the course of the sequence of ascending auctions. Consider a period in which several buyers
remain on the market from previous periods. Since buyers have revealed their values in the past,
there is essentially no private information within this group of buyers. However, when a new
buyer arrives, the “incumbent” buyers know nothing about the new entrant other than the distri-
bution from which her value is drawn. By behaving in a symmetric way that ignores previously
revealed information, incumbent buyers restore symmetry to the environment, thereby providing
the appropriate incentives for the new entrant to also reveal her own private information.
this equilibrium such that it satisfies Fudenberg and Tirole’s conditions for perfect extended Bayesian equilibrium. The
set of all such equilibria coincides, in finite games, with the set of sequential equilibria.
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6. REVENUE MAXIMIZATION
While the previous section provides a characterization of efficient mechanisms, we have said
little about revenue and optimal mechanisms. In the static setting, Myerson (1981) showed that
the optimal mechanism for selling a single indivisible unit is a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism,
with the caveat that instead of allocating the good to the agent with the highest value, the seller
allocates the object to the agent with the highest virtual value. Maskin and Riley (1989) extend
Myerson’s insights to the setting in which multiple identical units are offered for sale and show
that, as in the single-unit case, the objects are allocated to the set of buyers with the highest virtual
valuations.
In our setting, however, while the objects are individual units of a homogeneous good, from the
perspective of an individual buyer, they are differentiated products. To make this clear, consider
a buyer i with value vi who is present at period t. If this buyer receives an object in period t, this
yields her utility vi. However, if she anticipates receiving an object in period t + 1, her valuation
for that object is δvi. Thus, she does not value the two objects identically. While there does exist a
literature on auctions for multiple heterogeneous objects, much of the focus has been on efficiency
and not revenue maximization.13 Thus, paralleling the development of the previous section, we
will derive the optimal dynamic direct mechanism for a revenue maximizing seller. We will show
that revenue maximization in our dynamic setting is achieved by an efficient mechanism applied
to virtual values. We will then discuss the indirect implementation of the revenue maximizing
policy via a sequence of ascending auctions.
6.1. Optimal Direct Mechanism
We consider a single monopolist seller who commits to a direct mechanismM = {xt,pt}t∈N0
at time zero.14 The seller’s expected revenue from this mechanism is the expected discounted sum
of payments made by each buyer. Recalling that the expected payment of a buyer i, conditional
on entry, is denoted by mi(vi, αt, kt), the seller’s payoff may be written as
Π(M) := E
[
∞
∑
t=0
∑
i∈It
δtαt(i)mi(vi, αt, kt)
]
,
where αt(i) = 1 if i ∈ It arrives to the market (which occurs with probability pii ∈ [0, 1]) and
αt(i) = 0 otherwise.
Conditional on the arrival of agent i ∈ It in period t, when the current state of the market is
described by (αt, kt) ∈ {0, 1}I ×K, her expected payment is given by∫ v¯
0
mi(vi, αt, kt) fi(vi) dvi.
13Researchers interested in keyword auctions for sponsored search have, however, considered the problem of designing
optimal auctions for selling various advertising “slots” on a search engine, where slots are differentiated by their click-
through-rate. See, for instance, Iyengar and Kumar (2006).
14Commitment is necessary so as to ensure that that the revelation principle applies and it is without loss of generality
to consider direct mechanisms.
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By applying the revenue equivalence result from Corollary 1, this may be rewritten as
mi(0, αt, kt) +
∫ v¯
0
qi(vi, αt, kt)vi fi(vi) dvi −
∫ v¯
0
∫ vi
0
qi(v′i, αt, kt) fi(vi) dv
′
i dvi.
Applying the standard interchange of the order of integration of the last term above, the expected
payment of buyer i, conditional on entry, is then
mi(0, αt, kt) +
∫ v¯
0
qi(vi, αt, kt)ϕi(vi) fi(vi) dvi,
where
ϕi(vi) := vi − 1− Fi(vi)fi(vi)
is the virtual valuation of buyer i with value vi. Recall that we have assumed that ϕi is strictly
increasing in vi for all agents i ∈ I . Thus, applying the law of iterated expectations, the revenue
maximizing seller is faced with the problem of choosing a feasible mechanismM to maximize
Π(M) = E
[
∞
∑
t=0
∑
i∈It
δtαt(i)mi(0, αt, kt)
]
+E
[
∞
∑
t=0
∑
i∈It
δtαt(i)qi(vi, αt, kt)ϕi(vi)
]
, (4)
subject to the incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints discussed in Lemma 1
and Corollary 1.
Notice that the seller’s objective function above is the sum of two terms: the first term is a dis-
counted sum of expected payments, while the second is a discounted sum of weighted virtual
values. Moreover, this second term is identical to the efficiency-oriented social planner’s objective
function in Equation (4), except that values have been replaced with virtual values. Therefore, the
insights about the efficient policy carry over to this context. In particular, the revenue-maximizing
policy is again an assortative matching: objects are ordered by their arrival time and buyers are
ordered by their virtual values, and “earlier” objects are allocated to agents with higher virtual
values. Again, this matching must respect the feasibility constraints placed on the allocation rule.
Thus, the revenue-maximizing allocation policy is, in each period, to allocate all available objects
to the buyers with the highest virtual values currently on the market. Note, however, that allocat-
ing objects to agents with negative virtual values decreases the seller’s payoff. Thus, the matching
described above must restrict attention to buyers with non-negative virtual values.
Before proceeding to the formal description of this policy, some definitions are necessary. For
any state zt = (ht, αt, kt, v) ∈ Ht × {0, 1}I ×K×R, where v denotes the truthful reporting strat-
egy by all agents, let
Api(zt) := {i ∈ At : ϕi(vi) ≥ 0}
denote the set of agents with non-negative virtual values. The set of agents i ∈ Api(zt) whose
virtual value is among the kt highest present is given by
Api+(zt) :=
{
i ∈ Api(zt) :
∣∣{j ∈ At : ϕj(vj) ≥ ϕi(vi)}∣∣ ≤ kt} .
Similarly, the set of agents i ∈ Api(zt) whose virtual value places them outside the top kt agents is
denoted by
Api−(zt) :=
{
i ∈ Api(zt) :
∣∣{j ∈ At : ϕj(vj) > ϕi(vi)}∣∣ ≥ kt} .
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Finally,
Api∼(zt) := Api(zt) \
(
Api+(zt)
⋃Api−(zt)) .
is the set of agents tied for the kt-th highest ranking virtual value. The above observations and
Lemma 2 then yield the following characterization of optimal allocations.
LEMMA 4 (Revenue-Maximizing Allocation Rules).
Suppose all buyers, upon arrival, report their true values. A feasible allocation rule {xt}t∈N0 is optimal
(revenue-maximizing) if, and only if, for all zt = (ht, αt, kt, v) ∈ Ht × {0, 1}I ×K×R,
xi,t(zt) = 1 for all i ∈ Api+(zt) and ∑
i∈Api∼(zt)
xi,t(zt) = kt − |Api+(zt)| if |Api+(zt)| < kt.
As with the set of efficient allocation rules described by Lemma 2, all revenue-maximizing al-
location rules agree after almost all histories. The only possible variations are at probability zero
histories in which multiple agents have identical (positive) virtual values.15 Additionally, these
allocation policies are independent of past history, as optimal allocations are functions only of
the values of the agents currently present on the market and on the number of objects currently
available.
We will therefore refer to the revenue-maximizing allocation rule x˜. By this, we mean the
revenue-maximizing allocation rule which breaks ties with equal probability, which is defined
by
x˜i,t(αt, kt, vt) =

1 if i ∈ Api+
0 if i ∈ Api−
kt−|Api+|
|Api∼| if i ∈ A
pi∼
for all (αt, kt) ∈ {0, 1}I ×K and vt ∈ VAt , where we drop the dependence on ht.
It should be clear that the revenue-maximizing allocation rule x˜ satisfies the requirements of
incentive compatibility. From the perspective of a given buyer i ∈ I , x˜ allocates an object to
i after a given history if, and only if, i is among the highest-ranking (by virtual value) buyers
present at that history. Since we have assumed the standard regularity condition of increasing
virtual valuations, this implies that x˜i,t is nondecreasing in vi, given the values of the other agents
present on the market. The fact that this property holds for any arbitrary history and realization of
competitors’ values implies that it must also be true in expectation for each time period t; hence,
the expected discounted probability of receiving an object qi is also nondecreasing in vi. Thus, by
choosing an appropriate payment rule, it is possible to design an incentive compatible mechanism
that implements the revenue-maximizing allocation policy.
Let us now examine the first term in the seller’s objective function in Equation (4). Given the
incentive compatibility of the revenue-maximizing allocation policy, the generalization of the rev-
enue equivalence theorem presented in Corollary 1 implies that the individual rationality con-
straint faced by our seller is
mi(0, αt, kt) ≤ 0
15As with the efficient policies discussed in Section 4, we (without loss of generality) disregard the zero-probability
events in which an agent’s virtual value is equal to zero.
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for all i ∈ I and all (αt, kt) ∈ {0, 1}I ×K. Therefore, since mi enters the seller’s objective function
additively, this constraint must be binding.
The problem of choosing a payment rule that satisfies this constraint in this dynamic setting
is similar to the static optimal auction problem. In the static setting, the Myerson (1981) optimal
mechanism can be reinterpreted as a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. Instead of maximiz-
ing surplus, the revenue-maximizing single-object mechanism maximizes virtual surplus. When
agents report their values vi, the mechanism computes their virtual values ϕi(vi) and then applies
the VCG mechanism to these virtual values. This yields an allocation and a “virtual price” such
that the winning buyer’s virtual value less this virtual price is equal to her marginal contribution
to the virtual surplus. We can then invert this virtual price into a standard price, which in the
single-object case is the lowest value that could have been reported by the winning buyer such
that she remains the winner.
These insights can be applied in our setting; however, care must be taken to ensure that we
correctly account for the heterogeneous nature of the multiple goods available. In particular, one
cannot simply invert the price charged to winners via the virtual valuation functions to determine
the new prices, as prices will typically be functions of several agents’ values.
So, for each i ∈ I , define
r˜i := ϕ−1i (0).
This is the minimal value required for agent i to potentially receive an object under the revenue-
maximizing allocation policy. Furthermore, for each t ∈ N0 and all i ∈ It, we define for any
(αt, kt) ∈ {0, 1}I ×K and truthful vt ∈ VAt the function
Πi(αt, kt, vt) := E
[
∞
∑
s=t
∑
j∈I
δs−t x˜j,s(αs, ks, vs)
(
ϕ−1i
(
ϕj(vj)
)− r˜i)
]
. (5)
This expression is the same as the virtual surplus in the seller’s objective function in Equation (4),
except that instead of a weighted sum of virtual values, it is a weighted sum of the corresponding
“real” values of agent i, less the reservation value r˜i applied to agent i; that is, Πi measures the
virtual surplus in the same units as i’s utility function. Since we have assumed that virtual values
are increasing for all agents, ϕ−1i is increasing. Therefore, transforming the virtual values of all
agents by ϕ−1i preserves their ordering; moreover, ϕ
−1
i (ϕj(vj))− r˜i ≥ 0 if, and only if, ϕj(vj) ≥ 0.
Therefore,
x˜ ∈ arg max
{xs}∞s=t
{
E
[
∞
∑
t=0
∑
j∈It
δtαt(j)qj(vj, αt, kt)
(
ϕ−1i (ϕj(vi))− r˜i
)]}
;
that is, x˜ is an efficient allocation rule for an environment in which a social planner realizes a
payoff of ϕ−1i (ϕj(vj))− r˜i when allocating an object to agent j with value vj.
Again denoting by α−is the agent presence indicator in period s ∈ N0 when i is removed from
the market (that is, where we impose αs(i) = 0), we write
Πi−i(α
−i
t , kt, vt) := E
 ∞∑
s=t
∑
j∈I\{i}
δs−t x˜j,s(α−is , ks, vs)
(
ϕ−1i
(
ϕj(vj)
)− r˜i)

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for the virtual social welfare (in terms of i’s utility) when i is removed from the market. Thus, the
arrival of agent i ∈ It to the market yields a marginal contribution—again, in units of i’s utility
function—equal to
w˜i(αt, kt, vt) := Πi(αt, kt, vt)−Πi−i(α−it , kt, vt).
We now define the virtual Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism to be the dynamic direct mechanism
M˜ := {x˜t, p˜t}t∈N0 , where x˜ is the revenue-maximizing allocation rule and the payment rule p˜ is
defined by
p˜i,t(αt, kt, vt) := q˜i(αt, kt, vt)vi − w˜i(αt, kt, vt)
upon the arrival of agent i ∈ It in period t, and p˜i,s(αs, ks, vs) := 0 for all s 6= t. (We denote by q˜i
the discounted expected probability of i receiving an object under the allocation rule x˜.)
PROPOSITION 4 (Virtual VCG is Dominant Strategy IC and IR).
Suppose that virtual values ϕi are increasing for all i ∈ I . Then the virtual Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mecha-
nism M˜ is dominant-strategy incentive compatible and individually rational.
Thus, the virtual Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism M˜ is an optimal (revenue-maximizing)
dynamic direct mechanism. However, it is subject to the same criticism that we applied to the
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism: M˜ charges each buyer a single payment upon their arrival,
even if the agent is not immediately allocated an object. In the case in which the survival proba-
bility γ < 1, this implies that agents may make a payment but depart the market before receiving
an object.
We may compensate for this problem, as we did in the case of efficient mechanisms, by charging
payments such that each agent’s flow utility is equal to her current period contribution to the
virtual surplus. This quantity is defined by
w˜Fi (αt, kt, vt) := w˜i(αt, kt, vt)− δE [w˜i(αt+1, kt+1, vt+1)]
= Πi(αt, kt, vt)−Πi−i(α−it , kt, vt)
− δ
(
E
[
Πi(αt+1, kt+1, vt+1)
]
−E
[
Πi−i(α
−i
t+1, kt+1, vt+1).
])
We define the dynamic virtual pivot mechanism as the dynamic direct mechanism M˜F := {x˜t, p˜Ft }t∈N0 ,
where the payment rule p˜F is defined by
p˜Fi,t(αt, kt, vt) := x˜i,t(αt, kt, vt)vi − w˜Fi (αt, kt, vt)
for all (αt, kt, vt). As with the dynamic pivot mechanism discussed earlier, the dynamic virtual
pivot mechanism does not require agents to make any transfers in periods where they are not
allocated an object. If i does not receive an object, either ϕi(vi) < 0 or there are sufficiently many
agents with higher virtual values currently present on the market. In the first case, i’s presence
does not affect the allocation to any other agent, and hence her contribution is identically zero. If,
on the other hand, the latter is true, then removing i from the market will not affect the current-
period allocation, and hence i’s flow contribution is zero. It should also be clear that, if agent i
does receive an object, her flow marginal contribution to the virtual surplus is equal to her total
marginal contribution, as she will no longer be present in the future.
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Moreover, the expectation of a discounted sum of flow marginal contributions is equal to the
the total marginal contribution. Therefore, we have the following observation, which we state
without proof.
COROLLARY 3 (Dynamic Virtual Pivot Mechanism is Dominant Strategy IC and IR).
Suppose that virtual values ϕi are increasing for all i ∈ I . Then the dynamic virtual pivot mechanism M˜F
is dominant strategy incentive compatible and individually rational.
As with the case of optimal mechanisms in static settings, there is a clear tradeoff between
revenue and efficiency. The inefficiency of the revenue-maximizing mechanism stems from two
sources. First, there are buyers who, despite having positive values for an object, never receive
one. The second source of inefficiency enters due to the discriminatory nature of virtual values: a
buyer with a higher value may have the timing of her allocation delayed because of the presence
of a buyer with a lower value but higher virtual value.
This second source of inefficiency disappears in the symmetric case in which all buyers’ values
are drawn from the same distribution F. In this case, each buyer is faced with the same reser-
vation value r˜i = r˜ := ϕ−1(0), and the ordering of virtual values agrees with the ordering of
actual values. Moreover, the revenue-maximizing allocation rule becomes quasi-efficient, in the
sense that it allocates objects efficiently among the subset of agents with values greater than the
reserve value r˜. In addition, an agent’s marginal contribution to the virtual surplus in this case
may be reinterpreted in terms of social welfare. Recall that agent i’s marginal contribution to
the social welfare is the total surplus when i is present less the total surplus when she is absent.
Since a buyer with value 0 does not provide (or remove) any surplus from the market, the total
surplus when i is absent is unchanged when we add a “null” buyer with value zero. Therefore,
i’s marginal contribution may also be viewed as her “social replacement value,” where instead
of removing i from the market entirely, she is simply replaced with an agent whose value is 0.
Analogously, i’s contribution to the virtual surplus w˜i is her replacement value, where instead of
replacing i with an agent whose value is 0, we replace her with an agent whose value is equal
to the reservation price r˜. With this in mind, the link between optimal mechanisms and efficient
VCG-like mechanisms should not be surprising. In a static setting, Krishna and Perry (2000) show
that the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism is revenue-maximizing among all mechanisms that
are efficient, individually rational, and incentive compatible. Cavallo (2008) proves a similar re-
sult: in a dynamic setting with a fixed agent population and changing types, the dynamic pivot
mechanism is revenue maximizing among the class of efficient, individually rational, and peri-
odic ex post incentive compatible dynamic mechanisms. Therefore, when revenue maximization
leads to quasi-efficient allocation rules, a pivot mechanism with an appropriately chosen reserve
is optimal.
6.2. Optimal Auction
In light of the previous observation and the results of Section 4, when values are independently
and identically drawn from the same distribution F, a natural candidate for a revenue maximizing
auction is the sequential ascending auction. It is well-known that in a static setting with K units
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of a homogenous good to be allocated, efficiency is achievable by a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mech-
anism. This mechanism is outcome equivalent to a K-th price sealed-bid or ascending auction. As
established by Myerson (1981) in the case of a single object, and by Maskin and Riley (1989) with
multiple units of a homogenous good, the revenue-maximizing mechanism is a pivot mechanism
with a reserve price equal to r˜ := ϕ−1(0). This mechanism is again outcome equivalent to a K-th
price sealed bid or ascending auction with a reserve price equal to r˜. In our dynamic setting with
randomly arriving and departing buyers, both the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism and the dy-
namic pivot mechanism are efficient. Moreover, the outcome of the dynamic pivot mechanism
may be implemented via a sequence of ascending auctions. Reasoning by analogy, we may con-
clude that, since the dynamic virtual pivot mechanism is revenue maximizing and corresponds to
the dynamic pivot mechanism with a reserve of r˜, a sequence of ascending auctions with reserve
price r˜ is the corresponding revenue-maximizing auction.
Let us formalize this analogy. We again make use of the multi-unit, uniform-price variant of the
Milgrom and Weber (1982) button model of ascending auctions. However, we introduce a reserve
price equal to r˜. For notational convenience, we will assume that the price clock starts at zero
and rises continuously.16 When there are m ≥ 1 units available in a given period, the auction will
end whenever there are at most m bidders still active and the price is at least r˜. At that time, each
remaining bidder receives an object and pays the price at which the auction ended. As before, ties
are broken fairly.
Recall that we denote by nt := At the number of buyers present in period t. Also recall that,
taking the perspective of an arbitrary bidder i, we let
yt := (y1t , . . . , y
nt−1
t )
denote the ordered valuations of all other buyers present in period t, where y1t is the largest value
and ynt−1t is the smallest. For each m = 1, . . . , nt − 1, we define
v¯m := (v¯, . . . , v¯) ∈ Vm and y>mt := (ym+1t , . . . , ynt−1t ).
Finally, we define, for each m = 1, . . . , nt − 1,
w˜t+1(αt, kt, vi, y>mt ) := δE [w˜i(αt+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m, vi, y>mt )] .
This is the (discounted) expected future marginal contribution of an agent i ∈ At to the virtual
surplus, conditional on the period-t presence of m competitors with the highest possible value
v¯ and nt − m − 1 buyers ranked below i with values y>mt . Recall from the previous discussion,
however, that this is exactly i’s expected contribution to the social welfare over a replacement
agent with value r˜; moreover, note that w˜t+1(αt, kt, vi, y>mt ) = 0 for all buyers with values vi ≤ r˜,
regardless of the realization of y>mt .
In each period t ∈ N0, we assume that each agent i ∈ At bids up to the cutoffs β˜tm,nt whenever
she has m active competitors in the auction, where
β˜tm,nt(αt, kt, vi, y
>m
t ) := vi − w˜t+1(αt, kt, vi, y>mt ). (6)
16Alternately, one could model each auction as a two-stage game in which buyers first choose to participate in the
current period auction and then the price clock starts at r˜.
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These (symmetric across agents) cutoffs are strictly increasing in vi, implying that buyers can infer
the values of those competitors that have already exited the auction. Note that when buyer i is
active, and she knows the values y>mt of her opponents that are no longer active, the price at which
she is indifferent between winning an object and receiving her discounted marginal contribution
in the next period (conditional on all remaining active buyers having values greater than hers) is
exactly β˜tm,nt .
We may then use arguments similar to those of Lemma 3, Proposition 2, and Proposition 3 to
prove the following result.
PROPOSITION 5 (Revenue Maximization via Sequential Ascending Auctions).
Suppose that Fi = F for all i ∈ I . Then following the bidding strategies β˜tm,nt in Equation (6) in every
period of the sequential ascending auction mechanism with reserve price r˜ := ϕ−1(0) is a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium that is outcome equivalent to the truth-telling equilibrium of the dynamic virtual pivot mecha-
nism.
Proposition 5 therefore implies that the sequential ascending auction with a reserve price ad-
mits an equilibrium with prices and allocations identical to those of the dynamic virtual pivot
mechanism. Therefore, as was the case in Section 4, we find that a monopolist who wishes to max-
imize revenues while making use of a transparent, decentralized mechanism may do so by using
a sequence of ascending auctions. Moreover, the method of proof of the proposition above shows
that the strategy profile specified in Equation (6) forms a periodic ex post equilibrium. Given ex-
pectations about future arrivals and behavior, each buyer’s current period bid is a best response
to the strategies of her opponents, regardless of the realization of their values or the history of the
mechanism.
7. AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE, CONTINUED
In order to make the results of the previous section more concrete, let us return to the example of
Section 3. Recall that in this example, there is exactly one unit of the homogeneous good available
in each period, and at most one new buyer arriving to the market in each period with probability
ρ ∈ [0, 1]. In addition, buyers do not exit the market until they receive an object. Finally, each
buyer i’s privately known valuation for a single object is vi, where vi is drawn independently and
identically from the common distribution F. Virtual values ϕ(vi) are strictly increasing in vi, and
we denote by r˜ the value corresponding to a virtual value equal to zero: ϕ(r˜) = 0.
Lemma 4 established that, in order to maximize revenues, the optimal policy x˜ assigns the ob-
ject in each period to the buyer with the highest non-negative virtual value, which corresponds
(in this symmetric setting) to the highest value greater than r˜. Moreover, the subsequent discus-
sion (including Corollary 3) demonstrated that the dynamic virtual pivot mechanism succeeds in
implementing x˜ in dominant strategies.
In the relatively simple setting of this example, it is possible to derive explicit expressions for the
transfers in this direct mechanism. In particular, a straightforward adaptation of the arguments
found in in Appendix B used to characterize the social planner’s payoff may be used to calcu-
late the virtual surplus from the perspective of an arbitrary buyer. Suppose there are n buyers
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{1, . . . , n} present on the market, with values
v1 > v2 > · · · > vm > r˜ > vm+1 > · · · > vn.
Notice that, of the n buyers present, only m buyers have values greater than r˜.
Consider, for instance, buyer 2, the buyer with the second-highest value. If we increase her
value v2 by an infinitesimal amount, the optimal allocation in the current period is unchanged,
and the seller realizes no benefit from the increase. In the following period, however, buyer 2 is
allocated an object if either no new entrant arrives (which occurs with probability 1− ρ), or if a
new entrant arrives but has a value lower than v2 (which occurs with probability ρF(v2)). On the
other hand, if a new, higher-valued buyer does arrive in the next period, the revenue-maximizing
policy allocates the object to the entrant, and the seller must wait an additional period before
potentially realizing the gains from the increase in v2. Since the arrival process is stationary, this
implies that the marginal increase in the virtual surplus due to the increase in v2 is
δ
[
1− ρ(1− F(v2)) + ρ(1− F(v2))× δ
[
1− ρ(1− F(v2)) + ρ(1− F(v2))× δ [· · · ]
]]
= δ
∞
∑
t=0
[δρ(1− F(v2))]t
(
1− ρ(1− F(v2))
)
= δ
1− δ(1− F(v2))
1− δρ(1− F(v2)) .
Integrating this expression therefore captures the total contribution of buyer 2 over a “replace-
ment” buyer with value equal to r˜, yielding
δ
∫ v2
r˜
λ(v′) dv′,
where, as in Section 3, the function λ : V→ [0, 1] is given by
λ(v) :=
1− ρ(1− F(v))
1− δρ(1− F(v)) .
Therefore, the virtual surplus from the perspective of an arbitrary buyer is (with some abuse of
notation) given by
Πn(v1, . . . , vn) = Π0 +
m
∑
j=1
δj−1
∫ vj
r˜
λj−1(v′) dv′,
where
Π0 :=
δρ
1− δ
∫ v¯
r˜
(v′ − r˜) dF(v′)
is the expected virtual surplus when no buyers are present on the market. Notice that the values
of buyers m + 1, . . . , n do not enter the above expression. Since their values are below r˜, these
buyers are never allocated an object, and hence make no contribution to the virtual surplus. Thus,
removing any one of these agents from the market leads to no change in the virtual surplus. On
the other hand, the virtual surplus when buyer ik, where k ≤ m, is removed from the market is
given by
Πn−1(v1, . . . , vk−1, vk+1, . . . , vn) = Π0 +
k−1
∑
j=1
δj−1
∫ vj
r˜
λj−1(v′) dv′ +
m
∑
j=k+1
δj−2
∫ vj
r˜
λj−2(v′) dv′.
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Therefore, the marginal contribution of buyer k, where k ≤ m, to the virtual surplus is
w˜k(v1, . . . , vn) := Πn(v1, . . . , vn)−Πn−1(v1, . . . , vk−1, vk+1, . . . , vn)
=
m
∑
j=k
δj−1
∫ vj
r˜
λj−1(v′) dv′ −
m
∑
j=k+1
δj−2
∫ vj
r˜
λj−2(v′) dv′
=
m
∑
j=k
δj−1
∫ vj
vj+1
λj−1(v′) dv′,
where we abuse notation and let vm+1 := r˜. As with the efficient allocation rule discussed in
Section 3, removing buyer k from the market does not affect the allocation of those buyers ranked
above her; however, her presence shifts back the anticipated allocation to buyers ranked below
her by one period.
By setting transfer payments such that buyer k internalizes this effect, the dynamic virtual pivot
mechanism induces her to truthfully reveal her value. Recall that this mechanism makes transfers
in each period such that every agent i’s flow payoff is exactly equal to her flow marginal contribu-
tion to the virtual surplus. In this setting, an agent’s flow marginal contribution is zero unless she
receives an object. On the other hand, when the agent does receive an object, her flow contribution
to the virtual surplus is exactly equal to her total contribution. Therefore, when there are n agents
present with values v1 > · · · > vm > r˜ > vm+1 > · · · > vn, the dynamic virtual pivot mechanism
gives the object to buyer 1, charging her a payment p˜ such that
v1 − p˜ = w˜1(v1, . . . , vn).
Rearranging this expression (and again setting vm+1 := r˜), we see that the transfer paid by buyer
1 is given by
p˜ = v1 −
m
∑
j=1
δj−1
∫ vj
vj+1
λj−1(v′) dv′ = v2 −
m
∑
j=2
δj−1
∫ vj
vj+1
λj−1(v′) dv′. (7)
As demonstrated by Corollary 3 in Section 6, when the seller sets transfers as in the equation
above, the revenue-maximizing policy is implemented in dominant strategies. Notice the resem-
blance of this price to the corresponding transfer in the (efficient) dynamic pivot mechanism as
described in Equation (2). However, instead of the price depending on the values of all agents
present, the summation ends with the agent with the lowest value above r˜. This is precisely due
to the fact that the dynamic virtual pivot mechanism leaves buyer 1 with her marginal contribu-
tion over a replacement agent with value r˜, as opposed to a “null” agent with value zero.
Recall that Proposition 5 characterized an equilibrium of the sequential ascending auction (with
a reserve price) that is outcome equivalent to the dynamic virtual pivot mechanism. This equilib-
rium may be interpreted in the same manner as that discussed in Section 3. The price paid by
buyer 1 in Equation (7) can be decomposed into two components. The first term (v2) is the loss in
virtual surplus from allocating the object to buyer 1 in the current period: if she were not present,
the optimal allocation rule x˜ would assign the object to buyer 2, leading to a flow benefit of v2. On
the other hand, the summation in the expression above is the expected gain in the virtual surplus
33
MAHER SAID
from postponing the allocation to buyer 2. The presence of buyer 1 implies that the seller antici-
pates allocating to buyer 2 in the next period instead of to buyer 3, and to buyer 3 in the following
period instead of to buyer 4, and so on. As with the transfer of the dynamic pivot mechanism
calculated in Equation (2), this second term is the discounted expectation of buyer 2’s future con-
tribution to the virtual surplus.17 Thus, Proposition 5 may be restated as: if, in every period, each
buyer bids up to the point at which she is indifferent between receiving an object immediately
and receiving her expected future contribution to the virtual surplus, we are able to achieve the
outcome of the dynamic virtual pivot mechanism.
So, suppose that an ascending auction is conducted in every period. We assume that when there
are n buyers present at the beginning of the period, of which k are actively bidding in the auction,
each active buyer i bids up to
β˜k,n(vi) := vi − δE [Πn(v¯, . . . , v¯, vi, vk+1, . . . , vn)−Πn−1(v¯, . . . , v¯, vk+1, . . . , vn)] ,
where the expectation is taken with respect to the entry process of new buyers and the possible
valuation of a new entrant in the following period. (Recall that the values of buyers that have
already exited the auction are revealed by their exit prices.) In words, each buyer bids as though
she expects that losing the current-period auction leads to receiving her marginal contribution in
the future, conditional on her remaining competitors having the highest possible value v¯. This
expectation is equal to zero for buyers i with values vi ≤ r˜, as they contribute nothing to the
virtual surplus (in any period). Therefore, buyers with values less than the reserve price r˜ will bid
up to their true values, dropping out of the auction before the reserve price is met.
Of the remaining buyers (those with values greater than r˜), the first to exit the auction is buyer
m. She will drop out of the auction when the price reaches
β˜m,n(vm, . . . , vn) = vm − δE [Πn(v¯, . . . , v¯, vm, vm+1, . . . , vn)−Πn−1(v¯, . . . , v¯, vm+1, . . . , vn)]
= vm − δm−1
∫ vm
r˜
λm−1(v′) dv′.
Notice that this price is strictly greater than the reserve price, as vm > r˜ and λ(v′) ∈ [0, 1] for all
v′ ∈ [0, v¯]. The m− 1 remaining buyers observe this exit, and revise their anticipated exit prices.
As expected, these exit prices are monotonic in their values, leading to the agents sequentially
dropping out of the auction in increasing order of their values. Thus, the auction will end when
the price reaches
β˜2,n(v2, . . . , vn) = vi2 −
m
∑
j=2
δj−1
∫ vj
vj+1
λj−1(v′) dv′,
where vm+1 := r˜. Buyer 1, the buyer with the highest value present on the market, will win the
current-period object. In addition, the price she pays in the auction is exactly equal to the dynamic
virtual pivot mechanism transfer described in Equation (7). Thus, if each buyer bids according
to the functions described above, the sequential ascending auction leads to outcomes identical
to those of the dynamic virtual pivot mechanism. Moreover, as shown in Proposition 5, these
17This fact follows from a simple alteration to the argument found in Appendix B.
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bidding strategies, coupled with the appropriate off-equilibrium beliefs, form a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we examine a private-values, single-unit demand environment where buyers and
objects arrive at random times. We show that the efficient allocation policy may be implemented
by using a dynamic variant of the classic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. Moreover, by gen-
eralizing the static Myerson (1981) payoff- and revenue-equivalence results to our setting, we are
able to derive a revenue-maximizing direct mechanism. This mechanism succeeds in maximizing
a seller’s profits by applying an efficient dynamic pivot mechanism to buyers’ virtual values.
We also examine indirect mechanisms in this setting, finding that a sequence of ascending auc-
tions serves as a natural and intuitive institution that corresponds to the direct mechanisms de-
scribed above. This open auction format allows each buyer to learn her competitors’ values, and
hence determine her own marginal contribution to the social welfare. When each buyer exits each
auction at the price such that she is indifferent between winning the object and obtaining her mar-
ginal contribution, we obtain a decentralized price discovery mechanism that yields outcomes
identical to those of the centralized direct mechanisms.
These results set the stage for several additional avenues of inquiry. For instance, suppose that
objects need not be allocated in the period of their arrival, but can instead be placed in inven-
tory and allocated in future periods. While some properties of our solution are maintained (for
instance, the efficient policy continues to allocate objects to higher-ranked buyers before moving
onto competitors with lower values, and a dynamic VCG mechanism will continue to be efficient),
the indirect implementation results do not follow immediately. For example, in the case of storable
objects, the sale of an object to a particular agent imposes an additional externality on her com-
petitors, as the number of objects available in the future decreases. This reduces the incentives for
buyers to truthfully reveal their private information, as this information may be of great strategic
value to competitors.
Another natural extension of our model is the generalization to the case in which agents may
demand multiple units. This, however, introduces additional intertemporal tradeoffs in any auc-
tion mechanism, as expected future payoffs in individual valuations are no longer identical func-
tions of individual values when buyers have differential demands. An alternative line of research
relaxes the assumption that buyer entries and exits are exogenous. It is unclear what outcomes
will arise when buyers may instead condition their entry on market conditions. We leave these
questions, however, for future work.
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APPENDIX A. PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 1. We first show the necessity of the three conditions for incentive compatibility
and individual rationality. So, suppose that the mechanismM is both incentive compatible and
individually rational. Fix any t ∈ N0, any i ∈ It, and arbitrary (αt, kt) ∈ {0, 1}I × K. Then
incentive compatibility implies that, for all vi ∈ V,
Ûi(vi, αt, kt) = max
v′i∈V
{
qi(v′i, αt, kt)vi −mi(v′i, αt, kt)
}
.
Thus, Ûi(vi, ·) is an affine maximizer, and is hence a convex function of vi. Moreover, for all
vi, v′i ∈ V, incentive compatibility is equivalent to
Ûi(v′i, αt, kt) ≥ qi(vi, αt, kt)v′i −mi(vi, αt, kt)
= qi(vi, αt, kt)vi −mi(vi, αt, kt) + qi(vi, αt, kt)(v′i − vi)
= Ûi(vi, αt, kt) + qi(vi, αt, kt)(v′i − vi).
Thus, qi(vi, ·) is a subderivative of Ûi(vi, ·) at vi. Since Ûi(vi, ·) is convex in vi, it is absolutely
continuous and hence differentiable almost everywhere, implying that at every point of differen-
tiability,
∂
∂vi
Ûi(vi, αt, kt) = qi(vi, αt, kt).
Since Ûi(vi, ·) is convex, this implies that qi must be nondecreasing in vi.
Moreover, every absolutely continuous function is equal to the definite integral of its derivative,
implying that
Ûi(vi, αt, kt) = Ûi(0, αt, kt) +
∫ vi
0
qi(v′i, αt, kt) dv
′
i
for all vi ∈ V. Finally, since qi is nondecreasing in vi, the requirement of individual rationality is
then satisfied for all vi only if
Ûi(0, αt, kt) ≥ 0.
Hence, the three conditions are necessary conditions forM to be incentive compatible and indi-
vidually rational.
We now show the sufficiency of the three conditions for incentive compatibility and individual
rationality. Suppose that M satisfies the three conditions, and fix any t ∈ N0, any i ∈ It, and
arbitrary (αt, kt) ∈ {0, 1}I × K. Note first that qi is nondecreasing in vi and Ûi(0, αt, kt) ≥ 0
immediately imply that Ûi(vi, αt, kt) ≥ 0 for all vi ∈ V, and soM is individually rational.
Now, for any vi, v′i ∈ V, the second condition implies that
Ûi(v′i, αt, kt) = Ûi(vi, αt, kt) +
∫ v′i
vi
qi(v′′i , αt, kt) dv
′′
i .
If vi < v′i, then qi nondecreasing implies that qi(vi, αt, kt) ≤ qi(v′i, αt, kt). Thus,
Ûi(v′i, αt, kt) ≥ Ûi(vi, αt, kt) + qi(vi, αt, kt)(v′i − vi).
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Similarly, if vi > v′i, then qi nondecreasing implies that qi(vi, αt, kt) ≥ qi(v′i, αt, kt). Therefore,
Ûi(v′i, αt, kt) = Ûi(vi, αt, kt)−
∫ vi
v′i
qi(v′′i , αt, kt) dv
′′
i
≥ Ûi(vi, αt, kt)− qi(vi, αt, kt)(vi − v′i) = Ûi(vi, αt, kt) + qi(vi, αt, kt)(v′i − vi).
However, this inequality is, as shown above, equivalent to incentive compatibility. Since vi, v′i ∈ V
were chosen arbitrarily, this implies thatM is incentive compatible. 
Proof of Lemma 2. Note first that any two allocation rule that satisfy the conditions of the lemma
yield the same expected payoff to the social planner. To see this, note that the only variation
permitted is in the allocation of objects to agents with zero valuation and in the breaking of ties.
Given the allocations to all other agents, choosing to allocate to agents with value zero yields
neither an increase nor decrease in the realized surplus. Moreover, although the second condition
regarding the allocation to agents in A∼ allows for various mixtures over this set of agents, the
outcome of these mixtures is always the same: exactly kt − |A+| of these agents receive an object.
Different choices among these outcomes does not affect future payoffs, as the arrival process of
agents and objects is orthogonal to these allocative decisions, and all agents depart the system at
the same exogenously given rate 1− γ.
With this in mind, let x̂ denote a deterministic allocation rule that allocates an object to the
highest-ranking agents (including those with value equal to zero), where ties are broken arbitrarily
(but without randomization). Fix any policy x0 that yields the planner a strictly higher payoff than
the policy x̂, and define
Z0 :=
{
(ht, αt, kt) ∈ H× {0, 1}I ×K : x0(z) 6= x̂(z), x0(z′) = x̂(z′) for all z′ → z
}
.
Thus, Z0 is the set of all histories and arrivals z such that x0 and x̂ disagree at z, but agree on all
of z’s prefixes; that is, Z0 is the set of “first” or “earliest” disagreements between x0 and x̂. Since
x0 does strictly better than x̂, this set must have nonzero measure (with respect to the measure
induced by the arrival processes), as otherwise the two policies would agree almost everywhere
(and hence yield identical payoffs).
For each z ∈ Z0, note that the policy x0 induces a probability distribution over outcomes, where
an outcome is an assignment of objects to agents. Denote by Σ0(z) the set of outcomes induced
by x0 at history z. Thus, an outcome σ ∈ Σ0(z) is associated with a subset of buyers present that
receive an object. Let aj(σ) denote the j-th highest-valued agent that receives an object under x0 in
outcome σ. Similarly, let bj(z) denote the j-th highest-valued agent overall.
Define for each z ∈ Z0 and for each σ ∈ Σ0(z), we define the “continuation policy” xσ1 (z) to
be the allocation rule that allocates to the highest-ranking agents present at time z, and is equal to
x0 at all successors of z except that it allocates to agent aj(σ) whenever x0 allocates to agent bj(z).
Thus, xσ1 (z) is the same as x0 except that it “swaps” the allocation decisions of aj(σ) and bj(z).
Since vaj(σ) ≤ vbj(z) (with a strict inequality for at least one j), the expected payoff to the planner
under xσ1 is greater than that of x0 along this branch of the mechanism tree. To see why this is true,
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consider any v > v′ and t < t′. Since δ < 1, we have
(δtv + δt
′
v′)− (δtv′ + δt′v) = (δt − δt′)(v− v′) > 0.
Thus, even if agents do not depart the market, the planner’s payoff along this path is increases.
Thus, define the allocation policy x1 to be equal to x0 at all histories that are not successors to
histories in Z0. Furthermore, for each z ∈ Z0, we define x1(z) to be the stochastic policy that
chooses xσ1 (z) with the probability that x0 leads to outcome σ. Since this leads to an increase in
the planner’s payoff over x0 along every successor history to those in Z0, and this set has positive
measure, it must be the case that x1 yields a strictly greater payoff that x0.
If x1 yields the planner a payoff less than or equal to that of x̂, transitivity of the planner’s
payoffs leads to a contradiction, implying that there does not exist a policy x0 such that x0 does
strictly better than x̂, and hence that x̂ is optimal.
On the other hand, if x1 yields a payoff greater than that of x̂, we define the set
Z1 :=
{
(ht, αt, kt) ∈ H× {0, 1}I ×K : x1(z) 6= x̂(z), x1(z′) = x̂(z′) for all z′ → z
}
to be the set of x1’s “first disagreements” with x̂. We may repeat the procedure above to then
define a new policy x2 that agrees with x̂ at every z ∈ Z1, but does strictly better than either x1.
Notice that, if x1 does better than x̂, then we have arrived at a contradiction.
Proceeding in this manner, we construct a sequence of policies {xs}∞s=0 with associated expected
payoffs {Ws}∞t=0 such that Ws < Ws+1 for all s ∈ N0. Note, however, that for all s ∈ N0, xs agrees
with x̂ on at least all histories of length s. Since δs approaches zero as s becomes increasingly large,
this implies that
lim
s→∞Ws = Ŵ,
where Ŵ is the planner’s expected payoff from following policy x̂. Moreover, since {Ws} is an
increasing sequence, this implies that
Ŵ ≥Ws for all s ∈N0,
a contradiction. It must therefore be the case that there does not exist a policy x0 that yields the
planner a strictly higher payoff than x̂. Therefore, we may conclude that x̂ is, in fact, a socially
optimal policy. 
Proof of Proposition 1. As already established, the discounted expected probability of receiving an
object under the efficient allocation rule qˆi(vi, αt, kt) is nondecreasing in vi. Given the result of
Lemma 1, this implies that the VCG mechanism is incentive compatible. To see that it is individu-
ally rational, note that
Ûi(vi, αt, kt) = qˆi(vi, αt, kt)vi − mˆi(vi, αt, kt) = E [wi(αt, kt, vt)] ,
where the expectation is taken with respect the values of agents j ∈ At \ {i}. However, since the
social planner always has available to her the option of ignoring i’s presence on the market (which
imposes no externalities on the other agents), i’s marginal contribution to the social welfare must
be nonnegative. Thus, Ûi(vi, αt, kt) ≥ 0, implying that M̂ is individually rational.
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In order to show that truth-telling is a dominant strategy for all agents, fix an arbitrary agent
i ∈ It for arbitrary t ∈N0, and suppose that i knows the reported values v−i ∈ ×j 6=iV of all agents
other than i. Then, by reporting a value v′i upon her arrival in state (αt, kt), agent i’s payoff under
the VCG mechanism is
E
[
∞
∑
s=t
δs−t xˆi,s(αs, ks, (v′i, v−i))
]
(vi − v′i) + wi(αt, kt, (v′i, v−i))
= E
[
∞
∑
s=t
∑
j∈I
δs−t xˆj,s(αs, ks, (v′i, v−i))vj
]
−W−i(α−it , kt, v−i).
Since x̂ is the efficient policy, the first term above is maximized by setting v′i = vi. Moreover, the
second term does not depend on v′i. Hence, i’s expected payoff is maximized by truthful reporting
of her value, regardless of the reports of the other agents or the state upon i’s arrival; that is,
truth-telling is a dominant strategy. 
Proof of Lemma 3. Fix an arbitrary period t ∈ N0, and let αt and kt indicate the set of agents and
objects present on the market, respectively. Consider an agent i ∈ At with value vi, and suppose
that nt − m − 1 buyers have dropped out of the period-t auction, revealing values y>mt , where
nt := |At| is the number of agents present, and m ∈ {1, . . . , nt − 1}. We wish to show first that
vi > vj > ym+1t implies that
β̂tm,nt(αt, kt, vi, y
>m
t ) := vi − wt+1(αt, kt, vi, y>mt )
> vj − wt+1(αt, kt, vj, y>mt ) =: β̂tm,nt(αt, kt, vj, y>mt ).
Notice that
wt+1(αt, kt, vj, y>mt )− wt+1(αt, kt, vi, y>mt )
= δE
[
W(αt+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−m, vj, y>mt )
]
− δE
[
W−j(α
−j
t+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−m, vj, y>mt )
]
− δE
[
W(αt+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−m, vi, y>mt )
]
+ δE
[
W−i(α−it+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−m, vi, y>mt )
]
= δE
[
W(αt+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−m, vj, y>mt )
]
− δE
[
W(αt+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−m, vi, y>mt )
]
,
since removing either i or j in the following period, conditional on their being the m-th highest-
ranked agent, does not differentially affect the order of anticipated future allocations to any other
agents. In particular, since the the efficient allocation rule x̂ makes assignments based solely on
the ranking of valuations, it will choose the same assignments in future periods when i or j have
been removed from the market.
Moreover, by naïvely treating buyer j as though her true value were vi, we can provide a bound
on the difference above. In particular, we have
δE
[
W(αt+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−m, vj, y>mt )
]
− δE
[
W(αt+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−m, vi, y>mt )
]
≥ E
[
∞
∑
s=t+1
δs−t xˆi,s(αs, ks, vs)|vt = (v¯nt−m, vi, y>mt )
]
(vj − vi).
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Thus, if vi > vj, then
β̂tm,nt(αt, kt, vi, y
>m
t )− β̂tm,nt(αt, kt, vi, y>mt )
≥ (vi − vj)
(
1−E
[
∞
∑
s=t+1
δs−t xˆi,s(αs, ks, vs)|vt = (v¯m, vi, y>mt )
])
> 0
since the discounted expected probability of receiving an object in the future is bounded above by
δ < 1. Thus, β̂tm,nt(αt, kt, vi, y
>m
t ) is strictly increasing in vi.
Additionally, note that if vi > vj = ym+1t , then
wt+1(αt, kt, vj, y>m+1t )− wt+1(αt, kt, vi, vj, y>m+1t )
= δ
(
E
[
W(αt+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m+1, vj, y>m+1t )
]
−E
[
W(αt+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m, vi, vj, y>m+1t )
])
− δ
(
E
[
W−i(α−it+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m, vi, vj, y>m+1t )
]
−E
[
W−j(α
−j
t+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m+1, vj, y>m+1t )
])
.
However, the second difference above may be rewritten as
E
[
W−i(α−it+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m, vi, vj, y>m+1t )
]
−E
[
W−i(α−it+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m, vi, vi, y>m+1t )
]
+E
[
W−i(α−it+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m, vi, vi, y>m+1t )
]
−E
[
W−j(α
−j
t+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m+1, vj, y>m+1t )
]
.
Thus,
wt+1(αt, kt, vj, y>m+1t )− wt+1(αt, kt, vi, vj, y>m+1t )
is the sum of three differences. The first is the expected gain in social welfare when increasing i’s
value from vi to v¯. The second is the expected gain in social welfare (when i is not on the market)
from increasing j’s value from vj to vi. Finally, the third difference is the expected loss in social
welfare (when j is not present) from decreasing i’s value from v¯ to vi. However, since vj < vi, the
presence or absence of j from the market has no influence on when the efficient policy allocates to
i, regardless of whether i’s value is vi or v¯. Therefore, the gain from the first difference equals the
loss from the third difference, implying that
wt+1(αt, kt, vj, y>m+1t )− wt+1(αt, kt, vi, vj, y>m+1t )
= δ
(
E
[
W−i(α−it+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m, vi, vj, y>m+1t )
]
−E
[
W−i(α−it+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m, vi, vi, y>m+1t )
])
.
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Moreover, by (again) naïvely treating buyer j as though her true value were vi, we can provide a
bound on the difference above, which may be used to show that
β̂tm,nt(αt, kt, vi, vj, y
>m+1
t )− β̂tm+1,nt(αt, kt, vj, y>m+1t ) > 0.
Thus, the exit of the buyer with rank (m + 1) does not induce the immediate exit of any buyer
with a higher value. Therefore, since β̂tm,nt(αt, kt, vi, vj, y
>m+1
t ) is strictly increasing in vi, the price
at which this exit occurs fully reveals the value of the (m + 1)-th highest-ranked buyer.
Since m was arbitrarily chosen, this implies that the drop-out points of buyers bidding accord-
ing to the strategy described by Equation (3) are fully revealing of the buyers’ values. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Fix an arbitrary period t ∈ N0, and let kt denote the number of objects
present, and nt := |At| denote the number of agents present. As discussed above, the bidding
strategies β̂tm,nt are strictly increasing; therefore, the multi-unit uniform-price ascending auction
ends allocates the kt objects to the group of buyers with the kt highest values. Recall that if kt ≥ nt,
the auction ends immediately, and all buyers present receive an object for free. Similarly, in the
dynamic pivot mechanism, each buyer i receives an object, and makes a payment pˆFi,t given by
pˆFi,t(αt, kt, vt) = vi − wFi (αt, kt, vt),
where wFi is the agent’s marginal contribution to the social welfare.
18 However, since there are
sufficient objects present for each agent to receive one, i does not impose any externalities on the
remaining agents; thus,
wFi (αt, kt, vt) = wi(αt, kt, vt) = vi,
implying that pˆFi,t(αt, kt, vt) = 0. In this case, then, the allocation and payments of the auction
mechanism and the dynamic pivot mechanism are the same.
Suppose instead that kt < nt; that is, there are more agents present than objects. Denote by im
the bidder with the m-th highest value. Then each agent who receives an object pays the price at
which buyer ikt+1 drops out of the auction, which is given by
β̂tkt+1,nt(αt, kt, vikt+1 , . . . , vint ) = vikt+1 − wt+1(αt, kt, vikt+1 , . . . , vint ).
In the dynamic pivot mechanism, on the other hand, each agent i who receives an object pays a
price
pˆFi,t(αt, kt, vt) = vi − wFi (αt, kt, vt)
= vi −E
[
∞
∑
s=t
∑
j∈I
δs−t xˆj,s(αs, ks, vs)vj
]
+E
 ∞∑
s=t
∑
j∈I\{i}
δs−t xˆj,s(α−is , ks, vs)vj

= vi −
(
kt
∑
m=1
vm +E
[
∞
∑
s=t+1
∑
j∈I
δs−t xˆj,s(αs, ks, vs)vj
])
+
(
kt
∑
m=1
vm + (vikt+1 − vi) +E
[
∞
∑
s=t+1
∑
j∈I
δs−t xˆj,s(α
−i,−ikt+1
s , ks, vs)vj
])
.
18Note that since i is receiving an object, her total and flow marginal contributions are equal.
41
MAHER SAID
Rearranging and rewriting this expression yields
pˆFi,t(αt, kt, vt) = vikt+1 −E
[
∞
∑
s=t+1
∑
j∈I
δs−t xˆj,s(αs, ks, vs)vj
]
+E
[
∞
∑
s=t+1
∑
j∈I
δs−t xˆj,s(α
−i,−ikt+1
s , ks, vs)vj
]
= vikt+1 − wt+1(αt, kt, vikt+1 , . . . , vint ),
where the second equality follows from the fact that wt+1(αt, kt, vikt+1 , . . . , vint ) is defined to be the
expected future marginal contribution of the agent with the (kt + 1)-th highest value, conditional
on agents with higher values (which includes i) receiving an object today.
Thus, following the bidding strategies β̂tm,nt leads to period-t prices and allocations identical to
those of the dynamic pivot mechanism. Since the period t was arbitrary, as was the state (αt, kt),
this equivalence holds after each history. Thus, the two mechanisms are outcome equivalent. 
Proof of Proposition 3. We prove this proposition by making use of the one-shot deviation principle.
Consider any period with nt := |At| buyers on the market and kt objects present. Suppose that all
bidders other than player i are using the conjectured equilibrium strategies. We must show that
bidder i has no profitable one-shot deviations from the collection of cutoff points {β̂tm,nt}. More
specifically, we must show that i does not wish to exit the auction earlier than prescribed, nor does
she wish to remain active later than specified.
Once again labeling agents such that buyer i1 has the highest value and buyer int has the lowest,
note that if vi < vikt , bidding according to {β̂tm,nt} implies that i does not win an object in the
current period. Therefore, exiting earlier than specified does not affect i’s current-period returns.
Moreover, since the bidding strategies are memoryless, neither future behavior by i’s competitors
nor i’s future payoffs will be affected by an early exit. Suppose, on the other hand, that i has
one of the kt highest values; that is, that vi ≥ vikt . As established by Proposition 2, i receives
an object, paying a price such that her payoff is exactly equal to her marginal contribution to the
social welfare. Deviating to an early exit, however, leads to agent ikt+1 winning an object instead
of buyer i. Moreover, i’s expected payoff is then wt+1(αt, kt, vi, vikt+2 , . . . , vint ), which we defined as
i’s future expected marginal contribution. This is a profitable one-shot deviation for i if, and only
if,
wt+1(αt, kt, vi, vikt+2 , . . . , vint ) ≥ vi − β̂tkt,nt(αt, kt, vikt+1 , . . . , vint ).
Rearranging this inequality yields
β̂tkt,nt(αt, kt, vikt+1 , . . . , vint ) ≥ vi − wt+1(αt, kt, vi, vikt+2 , . . . , vint ) = β̂tkt,nt(αt, kt, vi, vikt+2 , . . . , vint ),
where the equality comes from the definition of β̂tkt,nt in Equation (3). Since vi > vikt+1 , this contra-
dicts the conclusion of Lemma 3. Thus, i does not wish to exit the auction early.
Alternately, if vi ≥ vikt , then planning to remain active in the auction longer than specified does
not change i’s payoffs, as i will win an object regardless. If, on the other hand, vi < vikt , then
delaying exit from the period-t auction can affect i’s payoffs. Since bids in future periods do not
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depend on information revealed in the current period, this only occurs if i remains in the auction
long enough to win an object. If i wins, she pays a price equal to the exit point of ivkt , whereas if
she exits, she receives as her continuation payoff her marginal contribution to the social welfare.
So, suppose that i = im for some m > kt. Then a deviation to remaining active in the auction is
profitable if, and only if,
vm − β̂tkt,nt(αt, kt, vikt , . . . , vim−1 , vm+1, . . . , vint ) ≥ wt+1(αt, kt, vm, . . . , vint ).
Rearranging this inequality yields
β̂tkt,nt(αt, kt, vikt , . . . , vim−1 , vm+1, . . . , vint ) ≤ vm − wt+1(αt, kt, vm, . . . , vint )
= β̂tm−1,nt(αt, kt, vm, . . . , vint ),
where the equality comes from the definition of β̂tm−1,nt in Equation (3). As above, the fact that
vm < vikt contradicts the conclusion of Lemma 3. Therefore, i does not desire to remain active in
the auction long enough to receive an object.
Thus, we have shown that no player has any incentive to deviate from the prescribed strategies
when on the equilibrium path. In particular, using the bidding strategies β̂tm,nt is sequentially ra-
tional given players’ beliefs along the equilibrium path. Recall, however, that we have specified
off-equilibrium beliefs such that buyers “ignore” their past observations when they observe a de-
viation from equilibrium play, updating their beliefs to place full probability on the valuation that
rationalizes the deviation; they believe that the deviating agent is currently being truthful with re-
gards to the strategies β̂tm,nt . The argument above then implies that continuing to bid according to
the specified strategies remains sequentially rational with respect to these updated beliefs. Thus,
bidding according to the cutoffs in Equation (3) is optimal along the entire game tree: this strategy
profile forms a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the sequential ascending auction mechanism. 
Proof of Proposition 4. As discussed above, q˜i(vi, αt, kt), the discounted expected probability of re-
ceiving an object under the revenue-maximizing allocation policy, is nondecreasing in vi, implying
that the virtual VCG mechanism is incentive compatible. To see that it is individually rational, note
that the expected utility from participating in the mechanism of an agent i with value vi = 0 is
Ûi(0, αt, kt) = −m˜i(0, αt, kt) = E [w˜i(αt, kt, vt)|vi = 0] ,
where the expectation is taken with respect to the values of agents j ∈ At \ {i}. However, since
ϕi(0) = − 1fi(0) < 0,
the revenue-maximizing allocation rule never allocates an object to agent i. Therefore, the optimal
policy yields exactly the same outcome whether or not i is present, implying that w˜i = 0 regardless
of the realizations of other buyers’ values. Thus, by Lemma 1, M̂ is individually rational.
In order to show that truth-telling is a dominant strategy for all agents, fix an arbitrary agent
i ∈ It for arbitrary t ∈ N0, and suppose that all agents other than i report values v−i ∈ ×j 6=iV,
which need not be truthful. Then, by reporting a value v′i upon her arrival in state (αt, kt), agent
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i’s payoff under the virtual VCG mechanism is
E
[
∞
∑
s=t
x˜i,s(αs, ks, (v′i, v−i))
]
(vi − v′i) + w˜i(αt, kt, (v′i, v−i))
= E
[
∞
∑
s=t
∑
j∈I
δs−t x˜j,s(αs, ks, (v′i, v−i))
(
ϕ−1i (ϕj(vj))− r˜i
)]
−Πi−i(α−it , kt, v−i).
Since x˜ is an efficient policy for maximizing the above sum of “transformed” virtual values, the
first term above is maximized by setting v′i = vi. Moreover, the second term does not depend on
v′i. Hence, i’s expected payoff is maximized by truthful reporting of her value, regardless of the
reports of the other agents or the state upon i’s arrival; that is, truth-telling is a dominant strategy
in the virtual Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. 
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof of this proposition parallels the developments of Section 5. In
particular, we will first show that bids are monotone and fully revealing, as in Lemma 3. Then,
we will show that following the postulated bidding strategies leads to an identical outcome as the
dynamic virtual pivot mechanism in a manner similar to the proof of Proposition 2. Finally, we
will, analogously to Proposition 3, show that these strategies do, in fact, form a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of the sequential auction mechanism.
CLAIM. The bid functions β˜tm,nt(αt, kt, vi, y
>m
t ) are increasing in vi for all m = 1, . . . , nt − 1. Moreover,
if vi > ym+1t , then
β˜tm,nt(αt, kt, vi, y
>m
t ) > β˜
t
m+1,nt(αt, kt, y
>m
t ).
Proof. Fix an arbitrary period t ∈N0, and let αt and kt indicate the set of agents and objects present
on the market, respectively. Consider an agent i ∈ At with value vi, and suppose that nt −m− 1
buyers have dropped out of the period-t auction, revealing values y>mt , where nt := |At| is the
number of agents present, and m ∈ {1, . . . , nt − 1}. We wish to show first that vi > vj > ym+1t
implies that
β˜tm,nt(αt, kt, vi, y
>m
t ) := vi − w˜t+1(αt, kt, vi, y>mt )
> vj − w˜t+1(αt, kt, vj, y>mt ) =: β˜tm,nt(αt, kt, vj, y>mt ).
Notice that
w˜t+1(αt, kt, vj, y>mt )− w˜t+1(αt, kt, vi, y>mt )
= δE
[
Π(αt+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−m, vj, y>mt )
]
− δE
[
Π−j(α
−j
t+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−m, vj, y>mt )
]
− δE
[
Π(αt+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−m, vi, y>mt )
]
+ δE
[
Π−i(α−it+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−m, vi, y>mt )
]
= δE
[
Π(αt+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−m, vj, y>mt )
]
− δE
[
Π(αt+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−m, vi, y>mt )
]
,
since removing either i or j in the following period, conditional on their being the m-th highest-
ranked agent, does not differentially affect the order of anticipated future allocations to any other
agents. In particular, since the the revenue-maximizing allocation rule x˜ makes assignments based
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solely on the ranking of valuations, it will choose the same assignments in future periods when i
or j have been removed from the market.
Moreover, by naïvely treating buyer j as though her true value were vi, we can provide a bound
on the difference above. In particular, we have
δE
[
Π(αt+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−m, vj, y>mt )
]
≥ δE
[
Π(αt+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯nt−m, vi, y>mt )
]
+E
[
∞
∑
s=t+1
δs−t x˜i,s(αs, ks, vs)|vt = (v¯nt−m, vi, y>mt )
]
(vj − vi).
Thus, if vi > vj, then
β˜tm,nt(αt, kt, vi, y
>m
t )− β˜tm,nt(αt, kt, vi, y>mt )
≥ (vi − vj)
(
1−E
[
∞
∑
s=t+1
δs−t x˜i,s(αs, ks, vs)|vt = (v¯m, vi, y>mt )
])
> 0
since the discounted expected probability of receiving an object in the future is bounded above by
δ < 1. Thus, β˜tm,nt(αt, kt, vi, y
>m
t ) is strictly increasing in vi.
Additionally, note that if vi > vj = ym+1t , then
w˜t+1(αt, kt, vj, y>m+1t )− w˜t+1(αt, kt, vi, vj, y>m+1t )
= δ
(
E
[
Π(αt+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m+1, vj, y>m+1t )
]
−E
[
Π(αt+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m, vi, vj, y>m+1t )
])
− δ
(
E
[
Π−i(α−it+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m, vi, vj, y>m+1t )
]
−E
[
Π−j(α
−j
t+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m+1, vj, y>m+1t )
])
.
However, the second difference above may be rewritten as
E
[
Π−i(α−it+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m, vi, vj, y>m+1t )
]
−E
[
Π−i(α−it+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m, vi, vi, y>m+1t )
]
+E
[
Π−i(α−it+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m, vi, vi, y>m+1t )
]
−E
[
Π−j(α
−j
t+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m+1, vj, y>m+1t )
]
.
Thus,
w˜t+1(αt, kt, vj, y>m+1t )− w˜t+1(αt, kt, vi, vj, y>m+1t )
is the sum of three differences. The first is the expected gain in virtual surplus when increasing i’s
value from vi to v¯. The second is the expected gain in virtual surplus (when i is not on the market)
from increasing j’s value from vj to vi. Finally, the third difference is the expected loss in virtual
surplus (when j is not present) from decreasing i’s value from v¯ to vi. However, since vj < vi,
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the presence or absence of j from the market has no influence on when the optimal (revenue-
maximizing) policy allocates to i, regardless of whether i’s value is vi or v¯. Therefore, the gain
from the first difference equals the loss from the third difference, implying that
w˜t+1(αt, kt, vj, y>m+1t )− w˜t+1(αt, kt, vi, vj, y>m+1t )
= δ
(
E
[
Π−i(α−it+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m, vi, vj, y>m+1t )
]
−E
[
Π−i(α−it+1, kt+1, vt+1)|vt = (v¯m, vi, vi, y>m+1t )
])
.
Moreover, by (again) naïvely treating buyer j as though her true value were vi, we can provide a
bound on the difference above, which may be used to show that
β˜tm,nt(αt, kt, vi, vj, y
>m+1
t )− β˜tm+1,nt(αt, kt, vj, y>m+1t ) > 0.
Thus, the exit of the buyer with rank (m + 1) does not induce the immediate exit of any buyer
with a higher value. Therefore, since β˜tm,nt(αt, kt, vi, vj, y
>m+1
t ) is strictly increasing in vi, the price
at which this exit occurs fully reveals the value of the (m + 1)-th highest-ranked buyer.
Since m was arbitrarily chosen, this implies that the drop-out points of buyers bidding accord-
ing to the strategy described by Equation (6) are fully revealing of the buyers’ values. 
CLAIM. Following the bidding strategies β˜tm,nt in every period t in the sequential ascending auction mech-
anism is outcome equivalent to the dynamic virtual pivot mechanism.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary period t ∈ N0, and let kt denote the number of objects present, and nt :=
|At| denote the number of agents present. As shown above, the bidding strategies β˜tm,nt are strictly
increasing; therefore, the multi-unit uniform-price ascending auction ends allocates the kt objects
to the group of buyers with the kt highest values greater than the reserve.19 Recall that if kt ≥ nt,
the auction ends immediately upon the price reaching the reserve value r˜, and all buyers present
receive an object at that price. Similarly, in the dynamic virtual pivot mechanism, each buyer i
with vi > r˜ receives an object, and makes a payment p˜Fi,t given by
p˜Fi,t(αt, kt, vt) = vi − w˜Fi (αt, kt, vt),
where w˜Fi is the agent’s marginal contribution to the virtual surplus.
20 However, since there are
sufficient objects present for each agent with a non-negative virtual value to receive one, i does
not impose any externalities on the remaining agents; thus,
w˜Fi (αt, kt, vt) = w˜i(αt, kt, vt) = vi − r˜,
implying that p˜Fi,t(αt, kt, vt) = r˜. In this case, then, the allocation and payments of the auction
mechanism and the dynamic pivot mechanism are the same.
Suppose instead that kt < nt; that is, there are more agents present than objects. Denote by im
the bidder with the m-th highest value. Then each agent who receives an object pays the greater
19Recall that buyers with values less than r˜ bid up to their true value, as they are never allocated an object, and so their
future expected contribution to the virtual surplus is zero.
20Note that since i is receiving an object, her total and flow marginal contributions are equal.
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of the reserve price r˜ and the price at which buyer ikt+1 drops out of the auction, which is given by
β̂tkt+1,nt(αt, kt, vikt+1 , . . . , vint ) = vikt+1 − wt+1(αt, kt, vikt+1 , . . . , vint ).
If vikt+1 < r˜, then the situation is identical to the previous case. Therefore, assume that vikt+1 ≥ r˜.
In the dynamic virtual pivot mechanism, on the other hand, each agent i who receives an object
pays a price
p˜Fi,t(αt, kt, vt) = vi − wFi (αt, kt, vt)
= vi −E
[
∞
∑
s=t
∑
j∈I
δs−t x˜j,s(αs, ks, vs)(vj − r˜)
]
+E
 ∞∑
s=t
∑
j∈I\{i}
δs−t x˜j,s(α−is , ks, vs)(vj − r˜)

= vi −
(
kt
∑
m=1
(vm − r˜) +E
[
∞
∑
s=t+1
∑
j∈I
δs−t x˜j,s(αs, ks, vs)(vj − r˜)
])
+
(
kt
∑
m=1
(vm − r˜) + (vikt+1 − vi) +E
[
∞
∑
s=t+1
∑
j∈I
δs−t x˜j,s(α
−i,−ikt+1
s , ks, vs)(vj − r˜)
])
.
Rearranging the above expression allows us to rewrite it as
p˜Fi,t(αt, kt, vt) = vikt+1 −E
[
∞
∑
s=t+1
∑
j∈I
δs−t x˜j,s(αs, ks, vs)(vj − r˜)
]
+E
[
∞
∑
s=t+1
∑
j∈I
δs−t x˜j,s(α
−i,−ikt+1
s , ks, vs)(vj − r˜)
]
= vikt+1 − w˜t+1(αt, kt, vikt+1 , . . . , vint ),
where the second equality follows from the fact that wt+1(αt, kt, vikt+1 , . . . , vint ) is defined to be
the expected future marginal contribution to the virtual surplus of the agent with the (kt + 1)-
th highest value, conditional on agents with higher values (which includes i) receiving an object
today. Therefore, following the bidding strategies β˜tm,nt leads to period-t prices and allocations
identical to those of the dynamic pivot mechanism. Since the period t was arbitrary, as was the
state (αt, kt), this equivalence holds after each history. Thus, the two mechanisms are outcome
equivalent. 
Finally, it remains to be seen that the bidding strategies in Equation (6) do, in fact, form an equi-
librium. As in the case of the sequential ascending auction with no reserve, the bidding strategies
β˜tm,nt are strictly increasing. Behavior along the equilibrium path is therefore perfectly separating,
implying that Bayesian updating fully determines beliefs. In order to determine optimality off
the equilibrium path, we again suppose that, after a deviation, buyers ignore their past observa-
tions and the history of the mechanism, and instead believe that the deviating agent is currently
truthfully revealing her value in accordance with the bidding strategies β˜tm,nt .
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CLAIM. Suppose that in each period, buyers bid according to the cutoff strategies given in Equation (6).
This strategy profile, combined with the system of beliefs described above, forms a perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium of the sequential ascending auction mechanism with reserve price r˜.
Proof. We prove this claim by making use of the one-shot deviation principle. Consider any period
with nt := |At| buyers on the market and kt objects present. Suppose that all bidders other than
player i are using the conjectured equilibrium strategies. We must show that bidder i has no
profitable one-shot deviations from the collection of cutoff points {β˜tm,nt}. More specifically, we
must show that i does not wish to exit the auction earlier than prescribed, nor does she wish to
remain active later than specified.
Once again labeling agents such that buyer i1 has the highest value and buyer int has the lowest,
note that if vi < max{vikt , r˜}, bidding according to {β˜tm,nt} implies that i does not win an object
in the current period. Therefore, exiting earlier than specified does not affect i’s current-period
returns. Moreover, since the bidding strategies are memoryless, neither future behavior by i’s
competitors nor i’s future payoffs will be affected by an early exit. Suppose, on the other hand,
that vi > r˜ and that i has one of the kt highest values; that is, that vi ≥ max{vikt , r˜}. As established
by Proposition 2, i receives an object, paying a price such that her payoff is exactly equal to her
marginal contribution to the virtual surplus. Deviating to an early exit, however, leads either to
agent ikt+1 winning an object (if vikt+1 ≥ r˜) instead of buyer i, or to an object being discarded.
Moreover, i’s expected payoff is then w˜t+1(αt, kt, vi, vikt+2 , . . . , vint ), which we defined as i’s future
expected marginal contribution to the virtual surplus. This is a profitable one-shot deviation for i
if, and only if,
w˜t+1(αt, kt, vi, vikt+2 , . . . , vint ) ≥ vi − β˜tkt,nt(αt, kt, vikt+1 , . . . , vint ).
Rearranging this inequality yields
β˜tkt,nt(αt, kt, vikt+1 , . . . , vint ) ≥ vi − w˜t+1(αt, kt, vi, vikt+2 , . . . , vint )
= β˜tkt,nt(αt, kt, vi, vikt+2 , . . . , vint ),
where the equality comes from the definition of β˜tkt,nt in Equation (6). Since vi > vikt+1 , this contra-
dicts the conclusion of the first claim above. Thus, i does not wish to exit the auction early.
Alternately, if vi ≥ max{vikt , r˜}, then planning to remain active in the auction longer than
specified does not change i’s payoffs, as i will win an object regardless. If, on the other hand,
vi < max{vikt , r˜}, then delaying exit from the period-t auction can affect i’s payoffs. Since bids
in future periods do not depend on information revealed in the current period, this only occurs
if i remains in the auction long enough to win an object. If i wins, she pays a price equal to the
larger of r˜ and the exit point of ivkt , whereas if she exits, she receives as her continuation payoff
her marginal contribution to the virtual surplus. So, suppose that i = im for some m > kt. Then a
deviation to remaining active in the auction is profitable if, and only if,
vm − β˜tkt,nt(αt, kt, vikt , . . . , vim−1 , vm+1, . . . , vint ) ≥ w˜t+1(αt, kt, vm, . . . , vint ).
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Rearranging this inequality yields
β˜tkt,nt(αt, kt, vikt , . . . , vim−1 , vm+1, . . . , vint ) ≤ vm − w˜t+1(αt, kt, vm, . . . , vint )
= β˜tm−1,nt(αt, kt, vm, . . . , vint ),
where the equality comes from the definition of β˜tm−1,nt in Equation (6). As above, the fact that
vm < vikt contradicts the conclusion of the claim above regarding the monotonicity of bids. There-
fore, i does not desire to remain active in the auction long enough to receive an object.
Thus, we have shown that no player has any incentive to deviate from the prescribed strategies
when on the equilibrium path. In particular, using the bidding strategies β˜tm,nt is sequentially ra-
tional given players’ beliefs along the equilibrium path. Recall, however, that we have specified
off-equilibrium beliefs such that buyers “ignore” their past observations when they observe a de-
viation from equilibrium play, updating their beliefs to place full probability on the valuation that
rationalizes the deviation; they believe that the deviating agent is currently being truthful with re-
gards to the strategies β˜tm,nt . The argument above then implies that continuing to bid according to
the specified strategies remains sequentially rational with respect to these updated beliefs. Thus,
bidding according to the cutoffs in Equation (6) is optimal along the entire game tree: this strategy
profile forms a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the sequential ascending auction mechanism. 
Thus, bidding in each period according to the strategy described in Equation (6) forms a per-
fect Bayesian equilibrium of the sequential ascending auction with reserve price r˜; moreover, this
equilibrium is outcome equivalent to the dynamic virtual pivot mechanism. 
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APPENDIX B. AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE:
SUPPORTING RESULTS
In this appendix, we formally state and prove two results relating to the example in Section 3.
The first characterizes the social planner’s payoff function from following the efficient policy x̂ in
a setting where there is exactly one object available in each period and at most one new entrant
arrives in each period (with probability ρ ∈ [0, 1]). Before we can prove the result, however,
we require the following technical lemma. Denote by C(Vn) the set of continuous real-valued
functions on Vn. In addition, for any k < n, let Ck(Vn) ⊆ C(Vn) denote the subset of such
functions that do not depend on their first k arguments. We endow C(Vn) with the sup-metric d∞,
where
d∞( f , g) := sup {| f (x)− g(x)| : x ∈ Vn} for all f , g ∈ C(Vn).
This implies that C(Vn) is a complete metric space.
LEMMA B.1 (Ck(Vn) is closed).
For any k ≤ n, Ck(Vn) is a closed subset of C(Vn).
Proof. Fix any convergent sequence { fm}∞m=1 in C(Vn) such that fm ∈ Ck(Vn) for all m ∈ N, and
let f ∗ ∈ C(Vn) denote the (uniform) limit of this sequence. Suppose, however, that f ∗ /∈ Ck(Vn).
Then there exist x, y ∈ Vn such that xi = yi for i = k + 1, k + 2, . . . , n, but f ∗(x) 6= f ∗(y). Let
e := | f ∗(x)− f ∗(y)| > 0.
Since fm converges to f ∗, there exists Mx ∈ N such that | fm(x)− f ∗(x)| < e2 for all m > Mx.
Similarly, there exists My ∈ N such that | fm(y)− f ∗(y)| < e2 for all m > My. Therefore, for any
m > max{Mx, My},
e = | f ∗(x)− f ∗(y)| ≤ | f ∗(x)− fm(x)|+ | fm(x)− fm(y)|+ | fm(y)− f ∗(y)|
<
e
2
+ 0+
e
2
= e,
a contradiction. The first inequality above follows from the triangle inequality, and the second is
due to the fact that fm ∈ Ck(Vn) implies fm(x) = fm(y). Therefore, we must have f ∗(x) = f ∗(y);
that is, there are no x, y ∈ Vn such that x and y agree on their last n− k arguments but f ∗(x) 6=
f ∗(y). Thus, we may conclude that f ∗ ∈ Ck(Vn). 
Define W0 to be the expected value to the social planner when there are no buyers present on
the market. Then
W0 = δ
[
(1− ρ)W0 + ρ
∫ v¯
0
(v′ +W0) dF(v′)
]
=
δρ
1− δ
∫ v¯
0
v′ dF(v′).
We now denote by Wn(v1, . . . , vn) the expected value to the social planner when there are n buyers
with values v1 > · · · > vn.
LEMMA B.2 (Characterization of Wn).
The planner’s expected payoff from implementing the efficient policy x̂ when there are n buyers present with
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values v1 > · · · > vn is given by
Wn(v1, . . . , vn) = W0 +
n
∑
j=1
δj−1
∫ vj
0
λj−1(v′) dv′,
where λ(v′) := 1−δ(1−F(v
′))
1−δρ(1−F(v′)) .
Proof. We begin by showing that W1 has the desired form and then proceed inductively. Note that
W1 is a fixed point of the operator T̂1 : C(V)→ C(V) defined by
[T̂(g)](x) := x + δ
[
(1− ρ)W0 + ρ
∫ v¯
0
g(y) dF(y)
]
.
This operator is clearly a self-map from C(V) into itself. Furthermore, it is straightforward to see
that T̂1 is a contraction. Fix any g, g′ ∈ C(V) such that g′ > g. Then
[T̂1(g′ − g)](x) = δρ
[∫ v¯
0
(g′(y)− g(y)) dF(y)
]
> 0.
Furthermore, for any g ∈ C(V) and any α ∈ R++,
[T̂1(g + α)](x) = [T̂1(g)](x) + δρα.
Since δρ < 1, we may apply Blackwell’s Contraction Lemma and the Banach Fixed Point Theo-
rem.21 These imply that T̂1 has a unique fixed point W1 such that
W1(v1) = v1 + δ
[
(1− ρ)W0 + ρ
∫ v¯
0
W1(v′) dF(v′)
]
.
Differentiating this expression with respect to v1 yields
W ′1(v1) = 1.
Finally, note that W1(0) = W0, since a buyer with value zero adds nothing to the social welfare.
Since the continuity of F implies the continuity of W ′1, we may apply the Fundamental Theorem
of Calculus, yielding
W1(v1) = W0 + v1 = W0 + δ0
∫ v1
0
λ0(v′) dv′.
Now consider Wn(v1, . . . , vn) for arbitrary n > 1, and suppose that Wn−1 takes the desired
form.22 Wn is defined to be a fixed point of the operator T̂n : C(Vn)→ C(Vn) given by
[T̂n(g)](x1, . . . , xn) := x1 + δ(1− ρ)Wn−1(x−1)
+ δρ
[ n−2
∑
j=0
∫ xn−j
xn−j+1
g(x2, . . . , xn−j, y, xn−j+1, . . . , xn) dF(y) +
∫ v¯
x2
g(y, x−1) dF(y)
]
.
Note that for any g, g′ ∈ C(Vn), [T̂n(g′ − g)](x) is given by
δρ
[ n−2
∑
j=0
∫ xn−j
xn−j+1
[g′ − g](x2, . . . , xn−j, y, xn−j+1, . . . , xn) dF(y) +
∫ v¯
x2
[g′ − g](y, x−1) dF(y)
]
.
21See Section C.6 of Ok (2007) for precise statements of the results we are applying.
22Notice that this implies that all of the cross-derivatives of Wn−1 are identically zero.
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If g′ > g, then this expression is strictly positive. Furthermore, for any g ∈ C(Vn) and any
α ∈ R++,
[T̂n(g + α)](x) = [T̂n(g)](x) + δqα.
Since δq < 1, Blackwell’s monotonicity and discounting conditions are satisfied. Thus, Blackwell’s
Contraction Lemma and the Banach Fixed Point Theorem imply that T̂n has a unique fixed point
Wn such that
Wn(v1, . . . , vn) = x1 + δ(1− ρ)Wn−1(v−1)
+ δρ
[ n−2
∑
j=0
∫ vn−j
vn−j+1
Wn(v2, . . . , vn−j, v′, vn−j+1, . . . , vn)) dF(v′) +
∫ v¯
v2
Wn(v′, v−1) dF(v′)
]
.
Differentiating this expression implicitly with respect to v1 yields
W(1)n (v1, . . . , vn) = 1 = δ0λ0(v1).
Note that this expression is independent of n and of vj for j 6= 1, implying that W(1,j)n is identically
zero for all j 6= 1.
Similarly, implicit differentiation with respect to v2 yields
W(2)n (v1, . . . , vn) = δ(1− ρ)W(1)n−1(v−1)
+ δρ
[ n−2
∑
j=0
∫ vn−j
vn−j+1
W(1)n (v2, . . . , v′, . . . , vn) dF(v′) +
∫ v¯
v2
W(2)n (v′, v−1) dF(v′)
]
.
Since W(1,j)n is identically zero,
n−2
∑
j=0
∫ vn−j
vn−j+1
W(1)n (v2, . . . , v′, . . . , vn) dF(v′) = F(v2).
Furthermore, W(2,1)n = W
(1,2)
n = 0 implies that∫ v¯
v2
W(2)n (v′, v−1) dF(v′) = (1− F(v2))W(2)n (v1, v−1)
Thus, making use of the inductive hypothesis that W(1)n−1(v−1) = 1, we may conclude that
W(2)n (v1, . . . , vn) = δ(1− ρ) + δρF(v2) + δρ(1− F(v2))W(2)n (v1, . . . , vn) = δλ(v2).
Once again, note that this expression is independent of n and of vj for any j 6= 2, implying that
W(2,j)n is identically zero for all j 6= 2.
Proceeding inductively, consider the derivative of Wn with respect to its k-th argument, where
k ≤ n. We have
W(k)n (v1, . . . , vn) = δ(1− ρ)W(k−1)n−1 (v−1) + δρ
[ n−k
∑
j=0
∫ vn−j
vn−j+1
W(k−1)n (v2, . . . , v′, . . . , vn) dF(v′)
+
n−1
∑
j=n−k+1
∫ vn−j
vn−j+1
W(k)n (v2, . . . , v′, . . . , vn) dF(v′) +
∫ v¯
v2
W(k)n (v′, v−1)
]
.
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Applying the same simplifications as above, along with our inductive hypothesis that W(k−1)n−1 (v−1) =
δk−2λk−2(vk), we have
W(k)n (v1, . . . , vn) = δ(1− ρ)W(k−1)n−1 (v−1) + δρF(vk)W(k−1)n−1 (v−1) + δρ(1− F(vk))W(k)n (v1, . . . , vn)
= δk−1λk−1(vk).
Finally, note that Wn(0, . . . , 0) = W0 since, as with a single buyer with value zero, “null” agents
provide no social benefit. By induction on n, we may then conclude that
Wn(v1, . . . , vn) = W0 +
n
∑
j=1
δj−1
∫ vj
0
λj−1(v′) dv′
for all n ∈N and all (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ Vn. 
The second result we wish to show in this appendix is a characterization of the discounted
expectation of buyer 2’s future marginal contribution to the social welfare. In order to do so, we
make use of the following lemma.
LEMMA B.3.
Suppose that, prior to the potential entry of a new agent, there are n buyers present with values v1 > · · · >
vn, and that the planner is using the efficient allocation rule x̂. Then the planner’s expected payoff is given
by
ρ
1− δ
∫ v¯
0
v′ dF(v′) +
n
∑
j=1
δj−1
∫ vj
0
λj(v′) dv′.
Proof. Recall that a new entrant arrives with probability ρ ∈ [0, 1], and that there is always a single
object available to be allocated. Therefore, applying Lemma B.2, the planner’s expected payoff
when entering a period with n buyers whose values are v1 > · · · > vn is, letting v0 := v¯ and
vn+1 := 0,
(1− ρ)Wn(v1, . . . , vn) + ρ
n
∑
k=0
∫ vk
vk+1
Wn+1(v1, . . . , v′, . . . , vn) dF(v′)
= W0 + (1− ρ)
n
∑
j=1
δj−1
∫ vj
0
λj−1(z) dz
+ ρ
n
∑
k=0
∫ vk
vk+1
(
k
∑
j=1
δj−1
∫ vj
0
λj−1(z) dz + δk
∫ v′
0
λk(z) dz +
n
∑
j=k+1
δj
∫ vj
0
λj(z) dz
)
dF(v′)
= W0 + (1− ρ)
n
∑
j=1
δj−1
∫ vj
0
λj−1(z) dz
+ ρ
n
∑
j=1
[
δj−1F(vj)
∫ vj
0
λj−1(z) dz + δj(1− F(vj))
∫ vj
0
λj(z) dz
]
+ ρ
n
∑
k=0
[
δk
∫ vk
0
(F(vk)− F(z))λk(z) dz− δk
∫ vk+1
0
(F(vk+1)− F(z))λk(z) dz
]
,
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where the final equality follows from interchanging the orders of summation and integration.
Combining terms and rewriting this expression yields
W0 + ρ
∫ v¯
0
(1− F(z)) dz +
n
∑
j=1
∫ vj
0
(
(1− ρ(1− F(z)))δj−1λj−1(z) + ρ(1− F(z))δjλj(z)
)
dz.
Note, however, that
(1− ρ(1− F(z)))δj−1λj−1(z) + ρ(1− F(z))δjλj(z)
= δj−1λj−1(z) [(1− ρ(1− F(z))) + δρ(1− F(z))λ(z)]
= δj−1λj−1(z) [(1− δρ(1− F(z))λ(z) + δρ(1− F(z))λ(z)] = δj−1λj(z).
Therefore, the planner’s expected payoff is given by
ρ
1− δ
∫ v¯
0
v′ dF(v′) +
n
∑
j=1
δj−1
∫ vj
0
λj(v′) dv′. 
With this result in hand, it is a matter of straightforward subtraction in order to determine that
the discounted expectation of buyer 2’s future marginal contribution to the social welfare is given
by
n
∑
j=1
δj−1
∫ vj
0
λj−1(v′) dv′,
as i2 is the highest-ranking buyer entering the next period.
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